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Abstract
The “taxation of the digital economy” is currently at the top of the global international tax
policymaking agenda. A core claim some European governments are advancing is that
user data or user participation in the digital economy justifies a gross tax on digital
receipts, new profit attribution criteria, or a special formulary apportionment factor in a
future formulary regime targeted specifically at the “digital economy.” Just a couple years
ago the OECD undertook an evaluation of whether the digital economy can (or should) be
“ring-fenced” as part of the BEPS project, and concluded that it neither can be nor should
be.
Importantly, concluding that there should be no special rules for the digital economy does
not resolve the broader question of whether the international tax system requires reform.
The practical reality appears to be that all the largest economies have come to agree either
that a) there is something wrong with the taxation of the “digital economy,” or b) there is
something more fundamentally wrong with the structure of the current international tax
system given globalization and technological trends.
This paper is intended as a limited exploration of the second (or third, or fourth) best. It
analyzes three policy options that have been discussed in general terms in the current
global debate. First, I consider whether “user participation” justifies changing profit
allocation results in the digital economy alone. I conclude that applying the user
participation concept in a manner that is limited to the digital economy is intellectually
indefensible; at most it amounts to mercantilist ring-fencing. Moreover, at the technical
level user participation faces all the same challenges as more comprehensive and
principled proposals for reallocating excess returns among jurisdictions. Second, I
consider one such comprehensive international tax reform idea, loosely referred to by the
moniker “marketing intangibles.” This idea represents a compromise between the present
transfer pricing system and sales or destination-based reforms to the transfer pricing
regime. I conclude that splitting taxing rights over “excess” returns between the present
transfer pricing system and a destination-based approach is complex, creates new sources
of potential conflict, and requires relatively extensive tax harmonization. This conclusion
applies equally to user participation and marketing intangibles. If such a mechanism were
nevertheless pursued, I suggest that a formulary system for splitting the excess return is
the most manageable approach. Third, I consider “minimum effective taxation” ideas. I
conclude that, as compared to the other two policy options discussed herein, minimum
effective taxation provides a preferable path for multilateral cooperation.
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Introduction1
For the upcoming University of Chicago Federal Tax Conference, I was asked to write a
paper “discussing what the US position should be and how the US tax rules should be
changed (or not) in reaction to European tax changes such as the proposed gross tax on
digital receipts, the digital PE, and the diverted profits tax.”
A core tax policy claim some European governments are advancing is that user data or user
participation in the digital economy justifies a gross tax on digital receipts, new profit
attribution criteria, or a special formulary apportionment factor in a future formulary
regime. One fundamental question these claims raise is whether there is anything unique
about the digital economy. In the BEPS project the OECD undertook an evaluation of
whether the digital economy can (or should) be “ring-fenced,” and concluded that it neither
can be nor should be. But the OECD’s conclusion is not stopping some European
governments from pursuing proposals that attempt to apply special tax regimes to a limited
set of digital businesses.2
Importantly, simply concluding that there should be no special rules for the digital
economy does not resolve the broader question of whether the international tax system
requires reform prompted in part by the digitalization of the economy. Indeed, a debate
about this question is ongoing at the OECD. We know more about the contours of that
debate today than we did when I was first asked to undertake this paper. The practical
reality appears to be that all the largest economies have come to agree either that a) there
is something wrong with the taxation of the “digital economy,” or b) there is something
more fundamentally wrong with the structure of the current international tax system in an
era of globalization and digitalization.3 Government representatives have now made this
plain in multiple public forums. So, one way or the other, we lack a stable status quo. 4

1

I thank Pamela Olson and Michael Plowgian for comments on an earlier draft. Oscar Velutini provided
excellent research assistance. Any errors are my own.
2
See, e.g., HM Treasury, Budget 2018 Digital Services Tax (Oct 29.
2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/75
2172/DST_web.pdf
3
See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Tax Challenges Arising from
Digitalisation
–
Interim
Report
2018
(2018),
https://www.oecdilibrary.org/content/publication/9789264293083-en; remarks of Brian Jenn at OECD-USCIB 2018 tax
conference (all major economies believe either the first or the second of the options). Stephanie Soong
Johnston, Official Previews Coming OECD Digital Economy Work, 90 Tax Notes Int’l 1329 (June 11, 2018).
4
For instance, David Bradbury of the OECD suggested the question of whether issues in the international
tax system were limited to the “digital economy” or were more pervasive was at the core of the current OECD
debate in his remarks at the International Fiscal Association [IFA] annual conference in Seoul in September.
See Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD Makes Headway on Long-Term Answers to Tax Digital Economy, 91
Tax Notes Int’l 1164 (Sept. 10, 2018); Stephanie Soong Johnston, News Analysis: Geeking Out: Digital
Taxation Debate Goes Viral at IFA Congress, 92 Tax Notes Int’l 19 (Oct. 1, 2018).
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This paper sets out some considerations for US international tax policymaking and
international tax diplomacy in this uncertain environment. To that end, Part I briefly
describes four disparate background considerations that should inform our thinking. Part
IA describes the decline of the arm’s length standard, which underpinned our historic
understandings about how to attribute profits as among entities within a multinational
corporation. I argue that internationally the arm’s length standard as we knew it before the
BEPS project is largely gone, and has been replaced by an unsustainable concept for profit
attribution that I label the “bourgeois labor theory of value.” Part IB describes the
relationship between the arm’s length standard, jurisdiction to tax, and the attribution of
profits to permanent establishments. It highlights that under OECD principles, attribution
of profits to permanent establishments is accomplished through application of the OECD’s
transfer pricing guidelines. Part IC recounts various acts of tax unilateralism abroad, often
focused on the tech sector, and including the trend towards abandoning historic limits on
jurisdiction to tax. Part ID describes the United States’ 2017 tax reform in that global
context, with a particular focus on the GILTI and the BEAT.
The remainder of the paper is intended as an exploration of the second (or third, or fourth)
best. For purposes of this paper, I therefore do not analyze options that were considered
and rejected in the most recent US tax reform, including a destination-based cash flow tax
or an integrated corporate tax system, and certain options that never made it into the most
recent tax reform debate, such as adopting a VAT.
The discussion is instead limited to three options that have been discussed in general terms
in the current global debate. Each of these options preserves a classic corporate tax system
that includes an entity-level tax on the normal return to capital. One further important
caveat is that in this paper I attempt as best I can to fill in ideas that have been described
with a very high level of generality with additional potential content, in order to motivate
the analysis.
Part II focuses on the European Commission and Her Majesty’s Treasury (“HMT”) stated
view that user participation should be acknowledged as a source of value creation in the
digital economy and concludes that the user participation concept has application well
beyond the so-called digital economy. Applying the concept in a manner that is limited to
the digital economy is intellectually indefensible; at most it amounts to mercantilist ringfencing.
The user participation theory does, however, have an important relationship to other more
generally applicable proposals for international tax reform. In particular, it involves a shift
towards destination-based income taxation, in much the same manner as some other
proposals for fundamental international income allocation reform, albeit only for one
sector.
At least two more comprehensive and principled proposals to reform the international tax
system’s attribution of profits are apparently now being considered at the OECD. These
respectively are often loosely referred to by the monikers “marketing intangibles” and
2
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“minimum taxation.” As publicly described, these ideas seem to be at an early stage of
development.
Part III evaluates a version of the “marketing intangibles” idea which I label the
destination-based residual market profit allocation (“DBRMPA”). Part IV evaluates a
version of a minimum tax system that combines inbound and outbound measures, and
which I label “minimum effective taxation.”
Part III builds on the discussion about “where we go from here” in transfer pricing provided
by Andrus and Oosterhuis in a paper for the 2016 University of Chicago conference. The
DBRMPA is related to that conference discussion of two years ago. In particular, it
represents a compromise between the present transfer pricing system and sales or
destination-based reforms to the transfer pricing system described in the
Andrus/Oosterhuis paper. Part III concludes that splitting taxing rights over “excess”
returns5 between the present transfer pricing system and a destination-based approached is
complex. It creates new sources of potential conflict as between sovereigns and as between
sovereigns and multinationals. Moreover, some destination specification problems for
which solutions do not exist or at least are not widely known would need to be addressed.
Finally, the DBRMPA likely requires extensive tax harmonization and information
exchange; more so than a minimum tax approach. Importantly all of the above conclusions
regarding a DBRMPA apply with equal rigor as technical critiques of user participation.
The difference is simply that a DBRMPA applies to the whole economy and therefore –
unlike user participation – has some principled basis. If a DBRMPA were pursued, Part
III suggests that a formulary mechanism for doing so is the least technically challenging
approach.
Part IV builds on the discussion of the GILTI and the BEAT in Part I as well as other
discussions of the pros and cons of those provisions in tax forums over the last year. Part
IV postulates that there may be a more sensible path for multilateral cooperation around
minimum effective taxation. This approach could be both responsive to the current global
international tax debate and build on (and help repair) our 2017 international tax reform. I
conclude that a minimum effective taxation approach would be preferable to a DBRMPA.
Part I. Background
IA. The Decline of the Arm’s Length Standard
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is intended to ensure that multinational
corporations (“MNCs”) do not obtain inappropriate tax advantages by pricing transactions
The term “super-normal return” has an understood meaning in economic theory. The term “excess return”
does not. I view the returns for which taxing rights may be reallocated in a DBRMPA to be related to but
not always the same as the “super-normal return” concept in economics, and so I use the term “excess returns”
going forward in this paper.
5
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within the group differently than independent enterprises would do at “arm’s length.”
More than half of world trade is now intra-firm.6 Thus, more than half of world trade is
subject to transfer pricing.
Under the arm’s length principle, multinational groups are supposed to divide their income
for tax purposes among affiliates in the different countries in which the MNC does
business, in a way that is meant to emulate the results that would transpire if the
transactions had occurred between independent enterprises. 7 For most of the last forty
years, the arm’s length principle represented a consensual solution reached among
technicians for the problem of allocating tax between different parts of an MNC. 8
Although the mantra of “arm’s length” masked real disagreement, and members of the
transfer pricing practitioner community often held the view that there was substantial
controversy as to the proper implementation of the arm’s length standard, the range of
interpretation was, in practice, reasonably narrow. Major transfer-pricing disputes arose
with regularity, but they were addressed within a framework that largely respected
intercompany contracts and the concept of allocation of risk within a multinational group.9
In the last decade, however, the “arm’s length standard” became extraordinarily
controversial.10 Transfer pricing even became the subject of contentious discussion among
“More than half of U.S. imports from its main non-NAFTA trading partners (with the exception of China
and Italy) are also intra-firm transactions. In contrast, U.S. exports to its main non-NAFTA trading partners
are predominantly arm’s-length – 53-65 percent of U.S. exports to large European Union and Asian countries
(France, Germany, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, and United Kingdom…) fit this description.” World Bank,
Arm’s-Length Trade: A Source of Post-Crisis Trade Weakness, Global Economic Prospects Special Focus 2
(June 2017), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/222281493655511173/Global-Economic-Prospects-June2017-Topical-Issue-Arms-length-trade.pdf.
7
See, e.g., OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes
with Value Creation, Actions 8-10-2015, at 9 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264241244-en
[https://perma.cc/25E8-UCKY] [hereinafter “BEPS ACTIONS 8–10”]. The arm’s length principle requires
that transactions between associated enterprises be priced as if the enterprises were independent, such that
the pricing reflects what third parties operating at arm’s length would agree upon with one another.
8
John Neighbour, Transfer pricing, Keeping it at arm’s length, OECD Observer, Apr. 21, 2002, at 29,
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/670/Transfer_pricing:_Keeping_it_at_arms_length
.html. Of course, important academic critiques and alternative proposals existed before the onset of the BEPS
project. See generally, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Splitting the Unsplittable: Toward a Formulary Approach to
Allocating Residuals Under Profit Split, Univ. of Michigan Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 378 (2013) (proposing that the OECD use formulary apportionment to allocate residual profit of
the “profit split method”).
9
See Matthias Schroger, Transfer Pricing: Next Steps in the International Debate, Tax Policy Challenges in
the 21st Century 310-12 (Karoline Spies & Raffaele Petruzzi eds., 2014). Whether one views that outcome
as good policy or not, the relatively clear intellectual boundaries for these disputes were an outgrowth of the
fact that discussion of transfer pricing was limited to tax administrators and other specialists.
10
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD Guidelines: A
Proposal for Reconciliation, 2 World Tax J. 3, 3 (2010) (arguing that while debate quieted with regard to the
arm’s length standard after the adoption of the 1995 regulations and OECD guidelines, the arm’s length
standard is unworkable and should be replaced by formulary apportionment); David Spencer, Senior Adviser,
Tax Justice Network, Statement by the Tax Justice Network (Mar. 21, 2012, 5:07 AM),
http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2012/03/tjn-statement-on-transfer-pricing.html (asserting that the “OECD’s
6
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high-level elected officials with no tax expertise at all.11 Moreover, the so-called “stateless
income” 12 narrative became commonly accepted by tax policymakers in almost every
developed economy.
As a result, preexisting norms developed by the community of transfer-pricing specialists
came under heavy and perhaps deserving scrutiny. Views around the level of deference to
be given to intergroup contractual arrangements in transfer pricing analyses diverged
substantially, the consensus on the scope for recharacterizing intergroup transactions
frayed, the consensus on respecting intergroup equity contributions declined. Disputes
among government officials about whether value creation in cross-border transactions
undertaken by multinationals should be attributed to capital, labor, the market, user
participation, or government support are now aired routinely. 13
Enormous political pressures coming from the highest levels of government and the G-20
meant that some sort of outcome on transfer pricing was politically necessary as part of the
BEPS project.14 Thus, in 2015, the BEPS project in effect endorsed the commonly held
idea that the then-existing OECD transfer pricing guidelines were broken. However, at the
technical level bureaucrats failed to reach meaningful consensus on a clearly delineated
alternative. The result was a reliance on high levels of constructive ambiguity buried in
many pages of technocratic language in the transfer-pricing outputs of the BEPS project. 15
One phrase that captures this ambiguity is the commitment to “align income taxation with
theory of the arm’s length principle no longer applies to multinational enterprises which are highly
integrated”).
11
See generally Stephen Timms, Fin. Sec’y to Treasury UK, Address at the OECD Tax & Development
Conference (Jan. 27, 2010); G-20, Cannes Summit Final Declaration – Building our Common Future:
Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All (Draft of November 4) (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html; see also Arun Jaitley, Hon. Fin.
Minister, India, A Tax Vision for India, Peterson Institute for International Economics (Apr. 16, 2015).
12
Ed Kleinbard deserves credit for naming the phenomenon and writing the most well-read article about how
US MNC international tax planning in the pre-BEPS era worked. See generally Edward D. Kleinbard,
Stateless Income, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699 (2011). However, his US outbound centric view created real
difficulties for the United States as a matter of international tax diplomacy. US tax reform is highlighting
the extent to which foreign multinationals, especially those headquartered in Europe, have been achieving
stateless income with respect to revenues earned in the United States for many years. Unfortunately, no
European academic has emerged who is willing to publicize and generalize about aggressive tax planning by
European MNCs in the manner Ed did for US-headquartered MNCs.
13
See generally Mindy Herzfeld, Input Needed on Transfer Pricing Drafts, 77 Tax Notes Int’l 392 (Feb. 2,
2015); China International Tax Center / IFA China Branch, Comments on Discussion Draft on the Use of
Profit Splits in the Context of Global Value Chains and other Related Transfer Pricing Issues (Feb. 6, 2015).
US officials, for example, have bemoaned this phenomenon in multiple public appearances.
14
See, e.g., comments Marlies de Ruiter, Interview: OECD’s de Ruiter says Forthcoming Changes to
Transfer Pricing Guidelines Achieve Correct Balance, 24 Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rep. 775 (Oct. 15,
2015) [hereinafter “de Ruiter Interview Comments”].
15
See generally BEPS ACTIONS 8–10, supra note 7; see also Michael L. Schler, The Arm’s-Length
Standard After Altera and BEPS, 149 Tax Notes 1149 (Nov. 30, 2015) (discussing ambiguities in the revised
transfer pricing guidelines associated with attributing income to various forms of activity, control of risk, or
something else).
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value creation.” Everyone agrees on the principle – but no one agrees what it means. 16
Nevertheless, if there was one central theme to the BEPS transfer pricing guidance taken
as a whole, it was to put great weight for purposes of allocating intangible income and
income associated with the contractual allocation of risk on “people functions.” The people
functions of interest were activities by people who are of sufficiently high skill to engage
in the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles
(the so-called “DEMPE functions”) as well as to be able to control financial risks, including
those associated with the employment of intangibles. It is these people functions that the
post-BEPS transfer pricing guidelines treat as “meriting” the allocation of excess returns
from intangibles. In contrast, contractual or legal ownership of an intangible is not
particularly significant, nor is “routine” labor.17 I call this approach to transfer pricing the
“bourgeois labor theory of value” (“BLTV”).
The labor theory of value asserts that the value of a good or service is fully dependent upon
the labor used in its production. This theory was an important lynchpin in the philosophical
ideas of Karl Marx. In contrast, conventional capitalist economic theory relies on a theory
of marginalism, in which the value of any good or service is thought to be determined by
its marginal utility. Moreover, the pricing of a good or service is based on a relationship
between that marginal utility, and the marginal productivity of all the factors of production
required to produce the relevant good or service. In addition to labor, a key factor of
production required to produce most goods and services is capital – including real and
intangible assets purchased with capital.
The BLTV attributes profits quite heavily to the labor of certain highly educated workers
who occupy upper middle management roles – roles and backgrounds broadly similar to
those who negotiate transfer pricing rules for governments. The theoretical basis in
economics for this BEPS transfer pricing settlement is unclear. It turns the Marxian labor
theory of value on its head while being inconsistent with the conventional economic view,
too. To my mind this feature makes it even less coherent than other possible bases for
transfer pricing.
In the 2013 to 2015 period, the BLTV clearly seemed like an attractive alternative theory
to various government officials. It addressed the “cash box” problem of multinational
income being parked in zero tax places like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, while
attributing income to what the relevant officials viewed as “meaningful” activity.

16

Public presentations offer an illustration of this disagreement: the national delegates and OECD officials
that participated in negotiations of the revised transfer pricing guidelines began providing conflicting
interpretations of what those guidelines meant almost immediately after the OECD’s new transfer pricing
guidelines were released. Compare de Ruiter Interview Comments, supra note 14 with comments of Brian
Jenn, quoted in Ryan Finley, Transfer Pricing Report Obscured by Terminology, 80 Tax Notes Int’l 229, 230
(Oct. 19, 2015).
17
See BEPS ACTIONS 8-10, supra note 7, ¶¶ 6.42-6.46.
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However, the post-BEPS BLTV version of the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines, if
implemented in good faith by tax administrations around the world, would effectively
provide that a multinational corporation can in various situations save hundreds of millions
or even billions of dollars by moving twenty or a hundred key jobs to a low-tax jurisdiction
from a high-tax jurisdiction. And many of those jurisdictions – Switzerland, Ireland, and
increasingly the UK – are attractive places to live, with talented, high-skill labor pools
already in place.
Requiring that DEMPE activities be conducted in tax-favorable jurisdictions in order to
justify income allocations to those jurisdictions encourages DEMPE jobs to move to those
jurisdictions. This transfer pricing result – that income may be shifted by moving highskilled jobs – is deeply geopolitically unstable. From the corporate perspective, there can
be huge incentives to shift DEMPE jobs if enough tax liability rides on the decision. At
the same time, large developed economies with higher tax rates simply will not accept an
arrangement that sees them losing both tax revenue and headquarters and R&D jobs.
In providing the above critique regarding the BEPS transfer pricing settlement, I do not
wish to be misunderstood. Outside the transfer pricing area (BEPS Actions 8-10), I believe
the BEPS project had many notable accomplishments. Global best practices and minimum
standards were developed with respect to important issues like hybridity, interest expense
deductions, information reporting, and more. The BEPS project certainly showed how soft
law in the international tax space can be quite efficacious. But transfer pricing is
sufficiently important that the failure to reach a sensible result in this space casts a shadow
over the BEPS project generally. The failure to grapple in a sensible way with the questions
raised by transfer pricing is one important reason the post-BEPS environment is
characterized by much of the global tax chaos the BEPS project was supposed to prevent. 18
IB. The Relationship Between the Arm’s Length Standard, Jurisdiction to Tax, and
the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments
Tax treaties specify when an enterprise based in one state has a sufficient connection to
another state to justify taxation by the latter state. Under Article 5 of the OECD Model
Tax Convention, a sufficient connection exists when an enterprise resident in one state (the
“residence state”) has a “permanent establishment” in another state (the “source state”).
The permanent establishment threshold must be met before the source state may tax that
enterprise on active business income properly attributable to the enterprise’s activity in the
source state. The permanent establishment rule encapsulated in Article 5 thus represents
the basic international standard governing jurisdiction to tax a non-resident enterprise.

18

Cf. The Global Tax Environment in 2016 and Implications for International Tax Reform: Hearing Before
the H.R. Comm. on Ways & Means, 114th Cong. (2016) (Testimony of Itai Grinberg, Associate Professor,
Georgetown
University
Law
Center),
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/20160224fc-Grinberg-Testimony.pdf.
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Under Article 7 of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention, profits attributable to a permanent
establishment (“PE”) are those that the PE would have derived if it were a separate and
independent enterprise performing the activities which cause it to be a PE. 19 In 2010, the
OECD issued a report on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments. The report
concluded that a PE should be treated as if it were distinct and separate from its overseas
head office; and that assets and risks should be attributed to the PE or the head office in
line with the location of “significant people functions.”
The post-2010 OECD approach to attributing profits to a PE is commonly referred to as
the Authorized OECD Approach (“AOA”).20 This approach is based on the adoption of
the 2010 version of the business profits article (Article 7) of the OECD Model Tax
Convention. Step one of the AOA leads to the recognition of internal dealings between the
PE and its head office. 21 Then, under step two, the guidance in the OECD’s transfer
pricing guidelines (“TPG”) is applied by analogy to determine the arm’s length pricing of
the internal dealing between the PE and the head office. 22 The 2010 report on the AOA
made clear that as the TPG were modified in the future, the AOA should be applied “by
taking into account the guidance in the Guidelines as so modified from time to time.” 23
In the BEPS project, many countries focused on the idea that technological progress
(especially the internet) and the globalization of business have made it easier to be heavily
involved in the economic life of another jurisdiction without meeting the historic
permanent establishment threshold. In the end the BEPS project produced some notable
changes to the permanent establishment threshold. 24 These changes to Article 5 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention are now being transposed into the global tax treaty network
via the multilateral instrument, which itself represents another success of the BEPS project.
Importantly, however, the BEPS project concluded that the AOA did not need to be
revisited in light of the changes to Article 5.
Fundamentally, the AOA was developed because if associated enterprises in different
countries were taxed under the arm’s length standard under Article 9, but PEs were taxed
19

OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017, art. 7 (2007),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/mtc_cond-2017-en [hereinafter “OECD Model Treaty”].
20
Not all countries adopted the AOA; as such the attribution of profits to PEs and various countries’
interpretations and practices with respect to Article 7 have continued to vary considerably.
21
See Commentary to Article 7, para 2 of the OECD Model Treaty (para 16 et seq).
22
The OECD agrees that this basic principle applies regardless of whether a tax administration has adopted
the AOA as explicated in the 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments. See
OECD, Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, BEPS Action 7, at 7
(2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/additional-guidance-attribution-of-profits-to-permanentestablishments-BEPS-action-7.pdf [hereinafter “OECD Additional Guidance”].
23
OECD, 2010 Report on The Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, ¶ 10 (July 22, 2010),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/45689524.pdf.
24
These changes primarily involved ensuring that commissionaire arrangements could not be used to avoid
a PE and modifications to the rules on specific activity exemptions. The latter change was viewed by the
OECD as being “particularly relevant in the case of digitalised businesses.” See, e.g., OECD Additional
Guidance, supra note 22, at 7.
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under some other rule under Article 7, distortions between structures involving PEs and
structures involving subsidiaries would arise. As a result, the OECD Model Tax
Convention attempts to apply the TPG and the arm’s length principle as consistently as
possible in both cases.25
Applying the AOA means that the PE and its head office are treated like independent
enterprises. Note, however, that modern tax treaty permanent establishment tests are built
to a significant degree on an underlying idea of dependence that differs from
dependence/independence of ownership. 26 Thus, the AOA taxes a permanent
establishment as if the PE and its head office are independent enterprises, but by definition
a dependent agent PE requires dependence. This paradox is a product of the decision to
have the transfer pricing rules trump the permanent establishment rules and make the arm’s
length standard the central organizing principle. 27 As a result, in our current legal
construct, discussing the attribution of profits to a permanent establishment requires
discussing which rules we wish to use to allocate MNE profits generally.
The alternative to the dependency criteria for establishing the existence of a PE is physical
presence. Arguably, that mechanism for establishing a PE is just a proxy for meaningful
presence in the economic life of a jurisdiction through dependent agents. Historically the
physical presence rule was also a pragmatic administrative consideration. The physical
presence of either an enterprise or a dependent agent of the enterprise was necessary in
order to collect tax revenues from a taxpayer. Today, however, the pragmatic consideration
is much less important in business-to-business transactions, given the development of
reverse-charging type mechanisms and the ability to require a resident business to withhold
from a non-resident. Moreover, in the internet era, it seems to me a losing argument to
suggest that large digital firms do not have a meaningful global presence. So the principled
debate with respect to jurisdiction to tax and attribution of profits to permanent
establishments is just the debate about how to allocate the profits of an MNE among
jurisdictions generally.28
IC. The Rise of International Tax Unilateralism and the Push to Tax Big Tech

See Commentary to Article 7, para 2 of the OECD Model Treaty, para 16 (“the basic approach incorporated
in the paragraph for the purposes of determining what are the profits that are attributable to the permanent
establishment is therefore to require the determination of the profits under the fiction that the permanent
establishment is a separate enterprise and that such an enterprise is independent from the rest of the enterprise
of which it is a part as well as from any other person… that faction corresponds to the arm’s length principle
which is also applicable, under the provisions of Article 9, for purposes of adjusting the profits of associated
enterprises.”)
26
The PE concept of dependence has been with us since the PE test was first developed in the League of
Nations, before the adoption of the arm’s length standard. See generally Richard J. Vann, Tax Treaties: The
Secret Agent’s Secrets, 3 BTR 345 (2006).
27
Id.
28
I acknowledge that there are enforcement challenges associated with requiring smaller businesses without
physical presence to pay tax in a jurisdiction, but I do not view that as a first-order issue.
25
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Many jurisdictions decided quite quickly that they were not satisfied with the BEPS
transfer pricing outcomes, at least with respect to specific companies or sectors where they
wished to collect more revenue. The marquee actor in this story is the United Kingdom.
In 2015, before the BEPS project had ended, the United Kingdom imposed a 25% tax on
profits deemed to be artificially diverted away from the UK. The Diverted Profit Tax
(“DPT”) targets instances where, under existing permanent establishment rules, an MNC
legitimately avoids a UK taxable presence, despite the fact that the MNC is supplying
goods or services to UK customers. The UK took the position that the DPT was not covered
by the United Kingdom’s income tax treaties, and therefore that the permanent
establishment rules tax treaties specify as to when a state has jurisdiction to tax an
enterprise based in another state did not apply to the DPT.
The primary justification for OECD countries recommending and the G-20 launching the
BEPS project had been to develop rules-based multilateral reforms that would prevent
unilateral actions by the countries participating in the BEPS project. The UK adopted the
DPT at the same time that it was helping lead the BEPS project. The UK’s decision both
to lead a multilateral project that was supposed to set internationally agreed rules that
would prevent inconsistent unilateral action, and at the same time unilaterally adopt the
DPT, a tax that was not consistent with BEPS, was broadly perceived as a significant blow
to tax multilateralism. The decision treated sovereignty as a license for organized
hypocrisy. But for the DPT, one could imagine that a more cooperative international tax
environment might have evolved out of the BEPS project.29
Under the DPT, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) can choose which
companies it wishes to pursue and to what degree. 30 Thus, the DPT also struck a blow
against non-discrimination principles in international taxation. Indeed, in press interviews
UK government officials referred to the DPT simply as the “Google Tax.” 31 The extent to
which the DPT is an arbitrary levy on targets of interest to HMRC is well-illustrated by the
twelve-fold increase in revenues raised by the DPT between 2015/2016 and 2017/2018. 32

29

Note also the inclusion of a digital services tax (DST) in the UK budget of October 29, 2018. The DST
represents another instance of UK unilateralism in the midst of a multilateral project in which it claims to
be a fully committed participant. HM Treasury, Budget 2018 Digital Services Tax (Oct 29.
2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/75
2172/DST_web.pdf
30
Dan Neidle et al., The UK Diverted Profits Tax: Final Legislation Published, Clifford Chance, Mar. 25,
2015, http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2015/03/the_uk_diverted_profitstaxfinallegislatio.html.
31
It is still known by that moniker. Vanessa Houlder, ‘Google tax’ take swells to £281m as levy starts to bite,
Financial Times, Sept. 13, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/4f7aed86-989f-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b.
32
See generally HM Revenue & Customs [HMRC], Transfer Pricing and Diverted Profits Tax statistics,
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/729876/T
ransfer_Pricing_and_Diverted_Profits_Tax_statistics.pdf (estimating an increase in the “DPT Yield” from
£31m in 2015/16 to £388m in 2017/18). DPT charging notices raised 57% of the revenue HMRC attributed
to the DPT in 2017/2018. The remainder was raised by what HMRC referred to as “behavioral change,” the
central element of which was “additional Corporation Tax paid as a result of HMRC intervention to ensure
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Twelve-fold increases in revenue without a change in the rate or rules simply do not happen
when tax law functions in the normal way. 33
Following the UK’s lead, by late 2017, countries as diverse as Australia, Argentina, Chile,
France, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, and Uruguay had
taken unilateral actions not limited by or consistent with the BEPS agreements. These
measures are generally designed to increase levels of inbound corporate income taxation.
Many are structured so that, as a practical matter, they primarily affect US MNCs. Among
other examples, in 2016 Australia enacted a DPT-like measure with a 40% tax rate (also
publicly known as the “Google Tax”). India imposed a 6% “equalization levy” on
outbound payments to nonresident companies for digital advertising services. India’s
legislation authorized extending the tax to all digital services by administrative action. The
Israel Tax Authority announced an interpretation of Israeli law that significantly reduces
the level of physical presence necessary for direct taxation of nonresident digital
companies. The Korean government is considering amendments to the Korean Corporate
Tax Act to override Korean tax treaties and treat “global information and communications
technology companies” as having a digital Korean PE. Uruguay has enacted, and
Argentina is considering, measures similar to those adopted in India. During this same
time period the Directorate-General for Competition (“DG Comp”) at the European
Commission reconceptualized its “state aid” concept in the international tax context,
notably by claiming that DG Comp was not limited by the OECD’s arm’s length standard
in determining whether tax rulings were consistent with EU law.34

that profits earned in the UK are taxed in the UK.” That is to say, HMRC threatened to charge DPT and
instead a company ‘voluntarily’ opted to pay more UK corporation tax.
33
Officials from the OECD and the IMF, as well as the canonical Vogel treatise, generally define taxes as
legally compulsory and unrequited payments to a government that do not provide a specific economic benefit.
Moreover, to qualify as a tax under these definitions, the required payment must be a result of law of general
applicability that is reasonably clear in its application. See, e.g., Werner Haslehner et al., Klaus Vogel on
Double Taxation Conventions Art. 2 at 26 (Ekkehart Reimer & Alexander Rust eds., 4th ed. 2015); Ken
Messere et al., Tax Policy: Theory and Practice in OECD Countries 240 (2003); Ruud De Mooij & Michael
Keen, Taxing Principles: Making the best of a necessary evil, Finance & Development, Dec. 2014, Vol. 51,
No. 4. So, to ask a provocative question – does the DPT meet that test? Note that after France enacted a
DPT-like tax, the French constitutional council struck the tax down on the basis that it gave the tax authority
too much discretion to selectively target individual taxpayers, and therefore was not constitutional under
French law. See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2016-744 DC, Dec. 29,
2016
(Fr.),
https://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/sites/default/files/as/root/bank_mm/decisions/2016744dc/2016744dc.pdf; see also Davide
Anghileri, France’s diverted profits tax ruled unconstitutional, MNE Tax (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://mnetax.com/frances-diverted-profit-tax-ruled-unconstitutional-18873.
34
In the Belgian state aid case, the Commission wrote that, “for any avoidance of doubt, the arm’s length
principle that the Commission applies in its state aid assessment is not that derived from Article 9 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention and the OECD TP Guidelines, which are nonbinding instruments, but a
general principle of equal treatment in taxation falling within the application of Article 107(1) of the Treaty,
which binds the Member States and from whose scope the national tax rules are not excluded.” Commission
Decision of 11.1.2016 on the Excess Profit Exemption State Aid Scheme SA.37667 Implemented by
Belgium,
C(2015)
9837
final,
para
150,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/256735/256735_1748545_185_2.pdf.
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More recently, governments around the world have been proposing or enacting taxes
targeted specifically at digital advertising and online platforms. India went first with its
previously-mentioned tax on digital advertising. Then, in September 2017, the European
Commission called for new international rules that would alter the application of
permanent establishment and transfer pricing rules for the digital economy alone. 35
Moreover, the Commission argued that until such time as a digital-specific reform of the
international tax system was agreed upon, an interim tax based on turnover, or a
withholding mechanism, should be imposed on digital platform companies. 36 The UK
followed up on the Commission’s digital tax proposals with its own position paper on
corporation tax and the digital economy.37 On October 29, 2018, the UK announced the
introduction of a “digital services tax” that is based on turnover and is explicitly ringfenced to hit only large search engine, social media, and online marketplace businesses. 38
Other unilateral measures focusing on the digital economy have been taken by India
(significant economic presence PE),39 Israel (digital PE), and others. Like the earlier round
of unilateral measures, some of these proposals have been described both in government
documents and in the media as taxes targeting “GAFA:” Google, Apple, Facebook, and
Amazon. However, the proposals generally are structured to have an impact beyond those
four corporations.
Separately, in 2017 Germany adopted its “Act against Harmful Tax Practices with regard
to Licensing of Rights.” New section 4j of the German Income Tax Act restricts deductions
for royalties and similar payments made to related parties if such payments are subject to
a non-OECD compliant preferential tax regime and are taxed at an effective rate below
25%.40 The provision also includes a conduit rule along the same general lines as US code
provision section 7701(l). 41

35

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient
Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, at 9, COM (2017) 547 final (Sept. 21,
2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/communication_taxation_digital_single_market_e
n.pdf.
36
Id. at 10.
37
That position paper was released after tax reform was introduced in the US House and US Senate, but
before the 2017 Act passed.
38
See HM Treasury, Budget 2018 Digital Services Tax (Oct 29.
2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/75
2172/DST_web.pdf
39
See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, India Budget 2018: Aiming for the Bullseye 28 (Feb. 2018),
https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/budget/2018/aiming_for_the_bullseye_pwc_union_budget_2018_booklet.p
df.
40
See Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [German Income Tax Act], § 4j; see also, e.g., EY, German
Parliament adopts legislation on limitation of tax deduction of royalties and tax exemption of restructuring
gains (May 2, 2017).
41
Id. (“If (i) the recipient of the payments or (ii) another party related to the German payer incurs expenses
for license rights from which the rights derive that are licensed to the German payer, and the recipient of
those payments benefits from an unqualified IP regime, then the deduction of the German licensee’s
payments are denied to the extent the ultimate payment recipient faces an effective rate below 25%.”)
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In 2017 the UK also opened consultations on a royalty withholding tax proposal, which is
now scheduled to be enacted and in force from 6 April 2019.42 This withholding tax would
generally apply where a non-UK entity making sales in the UK does not have a taxable
presence in the UK. Withholding is also extended to payments for the right to distribute
goods or perform specified services in the UK. Since there is no UK entity making a
payment, the proposal applies almost exclusively to cases where a non-UK company
selling to UK customers pays a royalty to a 3rd country jurisdiction. HMT describes the
proposal as a step to tax the digital economy, but acknowledges that it has application
beyond the digital sector. For example imagine a Brazilian MNC has a subsidiary in
Ireland making sales in the UK and paying a royalty to an entity in the Cayman Islands.
Under these proposals, the UK would be trying to withhold from the royalty paid from
Ireland to the Cayman Islands. The proposal thus raises the enforcement issues raised in
the canonical SDI Netherlands case.
Realistically, more unilateral measures to increase source country taxation, market country
taxation, or both are coming. These changes are likely to be somewhat uncoordinated, and
sometimes unprincipled. Moreover, these moves toward source or market country taxation
are likely to affect “old-line” businesses as well as the digital sector. Tax directors of
multinationals in a wide range of industries already highlight that the label “BEPS” is used
to justify a wide range of source-country tax adjustments that produce significant tax
controversies.
Historically the multilateral international tax architecture was focused on residence country
taxation. The international tax architecture around the world appears to be shifting towards
more source-based or destination-based taxation, but that transition is turning out to be
very messy. The strategic questions for the United States created by this unsettled state of
international tax affairs featured prominently in the final round of discussions about US
international tax reform. 43
ID. US Tax Reform, the BEAT and the GILTI
By the time of the 2016 elections, there was widespread consensus that the United States
needed to reform its aberrant international corporate tax system. Commentators called for
a lower corporate tax rate, and a move away from a deferral system and towards the
dividend exemption systems that had become an international norm. Other countries had
been taking these steps for years, while also increasing their reliance on consumption taxes
and decreasing their reliance on corporate income taxes.

42

See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/offshore-receipts-from-intangible-property/income-taxoffshore-receipts-in-respect-of-intangible-property
43
International Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (testimony of Itai
Grinberg,
Professor
of
Law,
Georgetown
University
Law
Center),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Grinberg%20October%202017%20SFC%20International%
20Tax%20Testimony%20FINAL.PDF [hereinafter “Grinberg Senate Testimony”].
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Nevertheless, at the outset of 2017, few commentators thought the US political system
would successfully bring a tax reform package to fruition. Then, as we all know, the United
States surprised the world by enacting tax reform. The international corporate component
of the reform was labeled as a shift to a “territorial” regime. However, the law enacted
actually moved the United States closer to a current worldwide tax system for outbound
taxation, instantiated in a regime now known as the “GILTI.” At the same time, the US
followed the global trend in enacting unilateral measures intended to strengthen inbound
taxation. The United States’ did so by adopting the “base erosion anti-abuse tax” in new
section 59A of the Code (“BEAT”).
The GILTI is the main subject of Dana Trier’s conference paper and the panel immediately
preceding the presentation of this paper at the conference. Therefore I will not go to any
great lengths to describe the GILTI here. Practitioners have also written about the various
twists and turns of the BEAT, and I do not propose to reconstruct the full breadth of that
discussion, either. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness a brief background on these
provisions is appropriate.
ID.1. GILTI
Section 951A requires each US shareholder of a controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) to
include currently in its gross income its share of global intangible low-taxed income
(“GILTI”) for the year. In very general terms, GILTl refers to a US shareholder’s share of
a CFC’s income above a 10 percent return on qualified business asset investment (“QBAI”)
with respect to everything other than five enumerated categories of CFC income. Those
categories are effectively connected income, subpart F income, income that would be
subpart F income but for the section 954(b)(4) high-tax kickout, certain intercompany
dividends, and foreign oil and gas extraction income. A US shareholder of a CFC includes
in income its GILTI in a manner similar to the inclusion mechanism for subpart F income.
GILTI is eligible for a fifty percent deduction under section 250 (through 2025). Therefore,
a minimum effective US tax rate of 10.5 percent applies to all GILTI earnings of CFCs of
US shareholders. Special rules apply regarding foreign taxes associated with GILTI. Very
generally, if a US shareholder that is a domestic corporation elects to take foreign tax
credits for a taxable year, all of the foreign taxes associated with GILTI are included in its
income as a deemed dividend under section 78. However, only 80 percent of these foreign
taxes are allowed as deemed paid foreign tax credits in the new GILTI foreign tax credit
basket.44
The New York State Bar Association (“NYSBA”) observes that the GILTI can be
understood conceptually as a hybrid between “a flat minimum domestic and foreign tax
rate on a US shareholder’s GILTI inclusions not associated with QBAI (the ‘flat rate
theory’) and the imperfect adding of the GILTI regime onto the subpart F regime (the ‘add-

44

26 USC. § 960(d)(1).
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on theory’).”45 One’s understanding of which theory should dominate can influence many
regulatory decisions. But no matter how one thinks about the regime enacted in the statute
(or how the regulations are written), the regime will generally produce at least a minimum
10.5% combined domestic and foreign tax on a US shareholder’s GILTI not attributable to
QBAI.46 Moreover, given that the concerns in international tax policy are overwhelmingly
intangible income-driven, and that the digital sector is “tangible asset light,” ignoring
QBAI constitutes a reasonable first-order simplification for purposes of this paper.
Finally, it should be noted that most of the complexity entailed by the international tax
regulations now being issued by the United States Treasury in this area are the product of
the QBAI concept, the foreign tax credit basketing system enacted for GILTI, and the
legislative design decision to layer a shareholder level calculation on top of entity-level
concepts. None of these features is inherent in or essential to enacting a flat rate minimum
tax policy.47
ID.2. The Relationship between GILTI and the Digital Tax Debate
The consequences of GILTI for the international tax debate in the “digital” space should
have been profound. When the BEPS project began, the digital economy was a special
area of focus because it was considered an important case of so-called “stateless income.”48
Following the 2017 legislation, the minimum tax rates on foreign earnings achievable for
US-headquartered firms have changed. Speaking generally, an intangible driven USparented multinational simply will not be able to achieve an effective tax rate on their
foreign earnings that is below 10.5%. An effective rate of 10.5% for corporate shareholders
New York State Bar Ass’n [NYSBA] Tax Section, Report No. 1394 on the GILTI Provisions of the Code
15
(May
4,
2018),
http://www.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2018/1394_Report.html.
46
Given the FTC limitations imposed because of the GILTI FTC basket, in many situations the combined
US and foreign tax rate on CFC income will be well in excess of 13.125%.
47
Indeed, neither Camp “Option C,” as eventually proposed in HR 1 2014 when Representative Camp
(Republican from Michigan) was chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, nor the “Option Y”
and “Option Z” proposals released by Senator Baucus (Democrat from Montana) in 2013 when he was Chair
of the Senate Finance Committee included a QBAI concept. Options Y and Z also used a partial
exemption/partial full inclusion and foreign tax credit and expense disallowance mechanisms that may
represent a more sensible and elegant way to address limitations on foreign tax credits and related expense
allocation issues in a minimum tax regime than the mechanism ultimately adopted by the United States in
2017.
48
OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, BEPS Action 1: 2014 Deliverable, 112
(Sept. 16, 2014) (“The comprehensiveness of the BEPS Action Plan will ensure that, once the different
measures are implemented in a co-ordinated manner, taxation is more aligned with where economic activities
take place… with the aim to put an end to the phenomenon of so-called stateless income.”). In fact large US
firms based in Silicon Valley were achieving very low rates of tax on their foreign earnings under the old US
international tax regime. See European Commission, Report of the Commission Expert Group on Taxation
of the Digital Economy (May 28, 2014). Consequently, European sovereigns took the position that special
measures might be needed to solve this problem, unless the US acted and imposed tax on the relevant firms.
At the same time, all the large developed economies said they had no interest in shifting the balance between
source and residence. France, Germany and the United Kingdom were particularly strong on this point.
45
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(after taking into account the 50% deduction described above) is comparatively
unfavorable to the CFC regimes of most of the major trading partners of the United States,
which typically tax CFC earnings in relatively limited circumstances. As a practical matter
the consequence is that BEPS leading to stateless income – the original driver for the entire
international tax reform debate – is now a phenomenon that exists only for non-US
headquartered multinationals.
Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, the four companies specifically targeted in documents
issued at various points by the Commission, the French government, and the German
coalition agreement, each face a 10.5% minimum tax on their foreign earnings. Since every
EU member state has a dividend exemption system that does not include a minimum tax,
and instead provides a 0% tax rate on foreign earnings when repatriated, companies like
Volkswagen, Allianz, Daimler, Siemens in Germany, or BNP Paribas and Carrefour in
France do not face a minimum tax burden on their foreign earnings. They can, and in some
circumstances still do, generate stateless income and achieve 0% tax on their foreign
earnings. That is the reality of current US corporate tax law as compared with the current
corporate tax law of the largest continuing members of the EU. Meanwhile, the UK’s
corporate tax reforms beginning in 2012 were explicitly designed to ensure the ability of
UK-headquartered multinationals to achieve a zero rate of tax on foreign earnings by
generally exempting those earnings from UK tax.
Therefore, when the Commission or HMT now propose a solution for the digital sector,
that proposal is not about addressing low taxed income or leveling an unlevel playing field
– the justifications given for rule changes in BEPS just a few years ago. Rather, the
proposals are now clearly about a revenue shift to move tax revenue from jurisdictions of
residence to the jurisdictions where digital companies have users.49
ID.3. BEAT
The BEAT was enacted to address legislative concerns that the former US international tax
regime made foreign ownership of almost any asset or business more attractive than US
ownership from a tax perspective, thereby creating tax-driven incentives for foreign
takeovers of US firms and foreign acquisition of business units previously owned by US
MNCs and financial pressures that encourage US MNCs to “invert” (move their
headquarters abroad), produce abroad for the US market, and shift business income to lowtax jurisdictions abroad. Until recently, little policy attention was given to reining in the
benefits that US law gives to inbound multinationals that make foreign status more
attractive than domestic status. In this regard the US was a global outlier: in the rest of
the world, governments have been focusing their policy efforts almost exclusively on
inbound taxpayers that minimize their income in local jurisdictions since the onset of the

49

For a balanced perspective on the broader question, see Wolfgang Schön, Ten Questions about Why and
How to Tax the Digitalized Economy, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5, at 79-81 (2018).
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financial crisis. With the BEAT, the US took a bold but highly imperfect step to join the
global consensus that inbound must be addressed.
New section 59A of the Code imposes an additional tax equal to the “base erosion
minimum tax amount” (the “BEAT tax”) of “applicable taxpayers.” 50 The BEAT tax
generally means “the excess (if any) of an amount equal to 10 percent… of the modified
taxable income of such taxpayer for the taxable year, over an amount equal to the regular
tax liability… of the taxpayer for the taxable year, reduced (but not below zero) by [certain
credits].” 51 In other words, the BEAT tax is calculated as the difference between the
corporation’s regular tax liability and an alternative calculation based on the corporation’s
modified taxable income.
Modified taxable income for BEAT tax purposes is generally defined as taxable income
computed without regard to any deduction with respect to a payment to a foreign related
party.52 Certain exceptions (notably for certain payments for services) apply. Payments
for cost of goods sold (“COGS”) also have no effect on the calculation of modified taxable
income because, as a technical matter, COGS are a reduction in gross receipts (rather than
a deductible payment). 53 The characterization of payments, especially with respect to
transactions involving bundled services and goods, can therefore affect whether a payment
is within the scope of the BEAT provision. The BEAT’s “modified taxable income” base
is also determined without regard to the base erosion percentage of any net operating loss
(“NOL”) allowed for the tax year.
Only “applicable taxpayers” are subject to the BEAT at all. To be an applicable taxpayer,
a US corporation and its affiliates 54 must meet certain criteria. 55 Notably, the US
corporation generally must have a “base erosion percentage” of 3 percent or higher. This
26 USC. § 59A(a). Section 59A is effective for “base erosion payments” paid or accrued in taxable years
beginning after December 31, 2017.
51
§ 59A(b)(1). Regular tax liability is defined in section 26(b). The applicable credits are: the excess of
“the credits allowed under this chapter against such regular tax liability” over, the sum of those “allowed
under section 38 for the taxable year which is properly allocable to the research credit determined under
section 41(a)”; and “the portion of the applicable section 38 credits not in excess of 80 percent of the lesser
of the amount of such credits. I.R.C. § 59A(b)(1)(B). Applicable section 38 credits are defined in section
59A(b)(4).
52
§ 59A(d). To be more precise, base erosion payments include any amount paid or accrued by the taxpayer
to a foreign person which is a related party of the taxpayer and with respect to which a deduction is allowable,
any amount paid or accrued by the taxpayer to a foreign person which is a related party of the taxpayer in
connection with the acquisition by the taxpayer from such person of property of a character subject to the
allowance for depreciation (or amortization in lieu of depreciation, reinsurance payments paid or accrued by
the taxpayer to a foreign person which is a related party, and certain other payments to an expatriated entity
which is a related party of the taxpayer which result in a reduction of the gross receipts of the taxpayer.
53
An item included in COGS can qualify as a base erosion payment if it is paid to certain inverted
corporations or members of an expanded affiliated group of an inverted corporation. See § 59A(d)(4).
54
§ 59A(e)(3) treats those persons classified as a single employer under section 52(a), with some
modification, as a single taxpayer for the purposes of calculating gross receipts and base erosion percentage.
55
Regulated investment companies, real estate investment trusts, and S corporations are also exempt from
the BEAT.
50
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base erosion percentage is generally determined by dividing the aggregate amount of a
taxpayer’s “base erosion tax benefits” for the taxable year, by the sum of the aggregate
amount of the deductions allowable to the taxpayer, plus certain base erosion tax benefits
allowable to the taxpayer.
The BEAT has been the subject of cogent critiques by the NYSBA and other
commentators.56 The key BEAT complications for purposes of this discussion relate to the
treatment of foreign tax credits and the base erosion percentage concept. In my view, these
two features of the BEAT should be removed.
Most tax credits are disregarded in determining regular tax liability for purposes of the
BEAT calculation. 57 Most importantly, foreign tax credits are disregarded. The treatment
of foreign tax credits under the BEAT disfavors foreign taxes paid by BEAT taxpayers
relative to any other business expense. In other words, foreign taxes are in effect not even
deductible for BEAT taxpayers. In various circumstances, the rule disregarding the value
of foreign tax credits for purposes of measuring hypothetical regular tax liability increases
the BEAT minimum tax dollar for dollar. 58 Foreign taxes paid by US MNCs are thus
treated almost as if they were equivalent to bribes and payments made to entities in Iran
and North Korea. This treatment is not justifiable. Moreover, disallowing foreign tax
credits has no clear relationship to base erosion.
Second, if a taxpayer’s “base erosion percentage” is 3% or less, they are not subject to the
BEAT. The base erosion percentage is generally determined by dividing the aggregate
amount of “base erosion tax benefits” of the taxpayer for the taxable year, by the sum of
the aggregate amount of the deductions allowable to the taxpayer plus certain other tax
benefits allowable to the taxpayer. Since both the numerator and denominator of the base
erosion percentage fraction represent gross rather than net concepts, the rule is highly
manipulable, and the cliff feature encourages manipulation.
Importantly, the BEAT includes a broad grant of regulatory authority to the Treasury. The
provision includes specific authority to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or
56

See NYSBA Tax Section, Report No. 1397 on Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax 6 (July 16, 2018),
http://www.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2018/1397_Report.html.
The
report politely explains a number of the ways in which the BEAT as enacted functions poorly. Certain
drafting errors associated with the current BEAT were deemed sufficiently problematic that the NYSBA felt
compelled to write that “we believe that Treasury has authority to construe the provision logically in
regulations to implement its legislative purpose, even in the absence of literal statutory support.”
57
Disregarded credits include foreign tax credits, 20 percent of low-income housing credits (section 42(a)),
20 percent of renewable energy production credits (section 45(a)), and 20 percent of section 46 investment
credits allocable to the energy credit (section 48). Research and Experimentation credits are not disregarded
for purposes of establishing the hypothetical regular tax amount against which BEAT liability is in effect
compared.
58
For examples and a formula, see generally Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The BEAT in a
Diagram and an Easy-to-Use Spreadsheet, Tax Notes (June 26, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/taxreform/economic-analysis-beat-diagram-and-easy-use-spreadsheet.
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appropriate. The BEAT also includes a number of specific grants of regulatory authority.
These include providing “for such adjustments to the application of this section as are
necessary to prevent the avoidance of the purposes of this section, including through” the
use of unrelated persons, conduit transactions, other intermediaries, or transactions
designed in whole or in part to characterize payments otherwise subject to the BEAT as
not subject to the BEAT, or (quite extraordinarily) even regulations preventing taxpayers
from obtaining benefits from substituting payments not subject to the BEAT as drafted
with payments that would normally not be subject to the BEAT. 59 The intent behind the
scope of this remarkable grant of specific regulatory authority is not discussed in the
legislative history. Nevertheless, the language is sufficiently expansive as to raise the
question of whether Congress intended the BEAT to give Treasury authority to reconsider
allocation of profits generally for minimum tax purposes.
Part II. Value Creation and User Participation60
Academic commentators of all ideological stripes have now explained in multiple articles
that the international tax system is not now, and never has been, based on a value creation
principle.61 Moreover, as I suggested in Part IA, no one entirely knows or agrees on the
precise meaning of “value creation.” Finally, the consensus academic view is that any
exercise to define specific sources of value creation is entirely subjective.62
Nevertheless, post-BEPS, various governments often repeat the mantra that “the
international tax framework is based on a principle that the profits of a business should be
taxed in the countries in which it creates value.” 63 One proposal that features prominently
among “value creationists” is known by the label “user participation.” It purports to give
appropriate credit to user participation in value creation in the digital economy. This idea
originated from HMT, was then taken up by the European Commission, and is now being
studied by the OECD.
59

Section 59A(i).
Part II of this paper draws heavily from a piece I recently published in the British Tax Review. Itai
Grinberg, User Participation in Value Creation, British Tax Review (forthcoming 2018).
61
See, e.g., Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Implications of Digitalization for International Corporate
Tax Reform (Oxford Univ. Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper No. 17/07, 2017),
https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/Series_
17/WP1707.pdf; Allison Christians, Taxing According to Value Creation, 90 Tax Notes Int’l 1379 (June 18,
2018); Joanna Hey, “Taxation Where Value is Created” and the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Initiative, 72 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4/5 (2018).
62
Id.
63
See, e.g., HM Treasury, Corporate Tax and The Digital Economy: Position Paper Update, ¶ 1.1 (Mar.
2018),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/689240/c
orporate_tax_and_the_digital_economy_update_web.pdf [hereinafter “HMT Position Paper Update”]. A
number of other reforms for the international tax system are also described by their advocates as reflecting
the “value creation principle.” One can best make sense of this development if one thinks of claiming the
mantle of “value creation” as simply a claim that the reform being discussed should be the new multilateral
norm.
60
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HMT and the European Commission both maintain there is something distinctive about
value creation in the digital economy. They focus on the example of a user uploading data
on a social media platform to illustrate the importance of user participation in the digital
space. The Commission argues that in this case user participation contributes to value
creation because users’ “data will later be used and monetised for targeted advertising. The
profits are not necessarily taxed in the country of the user (and viewer of the advert), but
rather in the country where the advertising algorithms has been developed, for example.
This means that the user contribution to the profits is not taken into account when the
company is taxed.”64
HMT and the Commission also assert there is something special about online marketplaces
and other “collaborative platforms,” that “generates revenue through matching suppliers
and purchasers of a good”, or “charges a commission for bringing together supply and
demand for assets and possessions owned by individuals. The success of those businesses
is reliant on the active involvement of users on either side of the intermediated market and
the expansion of that user base to allow the business to benefit from network effects,
economies of scale and market power.” 65 In contrast, HMT claims participation of users
in non-digital businesses is generally “passive.”
Two immediate questions arise with respect to the user participation theory put forth by
HMT and the Commission. The first question is whether there is any reason to believe that
users only meaningfully contribute to value creation in the context of certain digital
platforms. The second is how, across the whole of the economy, one would determine
when users contribute to value creation, and to what degree.
If user participation is a meaningful concept, it cannot be rationally limited to information
communication technologies. Consider a clinical trial from a user participation
perspective: such trials involve a corporation giving thousands of individuals free
medicine over a period of years in exchange for those users providing deeply personal
medical data, as well as a service to the company – the use of their bodies for purposes of
experimentation. The resulting data is monetized by obtaining a patent and customizing
products to specific diseases and patient populations. This user data is also required for
regulatory approvals, without which the company may not sell anything at all.
The data provided by patients is deeply private biometric and health information. In this
sense, the data users provide in exchange for free products in the medical economy is often
substantially more extensive and personal than the data that a digital user provides.
Moreover, their engagement with the providers of their treatment is often more sustained
64

European Commission Memorandum MEMO/18/214, Questions and Answers on Fair and Efficient Tax
System in the EU for the Digital Single Market (Mar. 21, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-18-2141_en.htm.
65
See HM Treasury, Corporate Tax and The Digital Economy: Position Paper, ¶ 3.18 (Nov. 2017),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/661458/c
orporate_tax_and_the_digital_economy_position_paper.pdf.
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than a digital user of a social media platform. After all, in some cases disengaging from
the company (ceasing to supply data in exchange for treatment) might fundamentally
impact a drug user’s health. In sum, both active user participation and data contribution
appear to be part of the medical economy.
The most meaningful objection to the above analogy between user participation in the
digital economy and user participation in the medical economy relates to the fact that the
medical economy generally does not benefit from either “multisided business models” or
network effects. Indeed Commission, HMT, and OECD documents each often highlight
these two economic phenomena in describing potential justifications for a special profit
allocation for user participation in the digital economy. 66
Neither multisided business models nor network effects are new economic phenomena, nor
are those phenomena limited to the digital platform businesses affected by user
participation proposals. Multisided platform businesses are generally defined as
businesses that a) offer distinct products or services, b) to different groups of customers, c)
whom a “platform” connects, c) in simultaneous transactions. In simpler terms, they are
market makers – businesses that help unrelated parties get together to exchange value.
Network effects refer to the phenomenon whereby a product or service gains additional
value as more people use it.
Before the advent of the internet, the classic example of a multisided business model with
network effects used in economics discussions involved financial intermediation. Credit
card businesses represent one example. On one side of the business consumers are offered
convenience and financing, and on the other side merchants obtain a mechanism to receive
payment other than in cash. Moreover, the more merchants accept a credit card, the more
attractive a credit card is to consumers, and the more consumers hold a credit card, the
more willing merchants are to accept the card and its related interconnection fee. 67 Other
“non-digital” multi-sided business models with network effects include newspapers,
traditional broadcast television, video game consoles, financial exchanges, and even
farmer’s markets (which charge rent to sellers, and allow shoppers to enter the market for
free).
Of course a farmer’s market has network effects because it is more valuable to buyers and
sellers respectively to the extent that there are more famers and more local shoppers
participating. However, the magnitude of the network effect is much greater, and
66

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient
Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market, supra note 35, at 9; OECD, Tax Challenges
Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018 (2018), supra note 3, para 47, page 28.
67
These businesses all exhibit what economists call “indirect network effects.” D. Evans & R. Schmalensee,
Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms 667 (2016). Indirect network effects exist
where the value of the two-sided platform to one group of participants depends on how many members of a
different group participate. Evans & Schmalensee 25. Airbnb, Uber, and other businesses that intermediate
transactions between groups of buyers of goods and services and groups of sellers of goods and services also
share this feature that the value they provides increases as the number of participants on both sides of the
platform increases.
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potentially more salient for tax purposes, when the “platform” (the marketplace) involved
can intermediate transactions globally. That issue of magnitude is presumably what HMT
and the European Commission think is special – network effects and multi-sided business
models combined with so-called “cross-jurisdictional scale without mass.”
Focusing on the issue of large network effects combined with cross-jurisdictional scale
without mass brings us to financial exchanges. Network effects are the key feature of
successful financial market making, because for transactions to take place there must be
both buyers and sellers. Specifically, market liquidity is an important feature in
determining transaction costs and making a market attractive to participants, and the
number of participants is what determines liquidity. As the number of buyers and sellers
on a given exchange increase, liquidity increases, and costs fall. Without enough buyers
and sellers, the market literally falls apart.
As an example, consider the Lloyd’s insurance marketplace, based in the UK. The vast
majority of Lloyd’s business involves insuring non-UK risks, often without any physical
presence in the jurisdictions where the covered risk exists on behalf of either Lloyd’s or
the underwriters and syndicates that form the Lloyd’s marketplace. 68 Moreover, the vast
majority of the capital in the Lloyd’s market does not come from the UK. 69 But, as Lloyd’s
itself explains, the certainty provided by the marketplace as well as the network effects
from Lloyd’s global network of insurance companies, brokers, and coverholders “makes
Lloyd’s the world’s leading (re)insurance platform.” 70 The London stock exchange is
another important financial marketplace, albeit one where at least some of the offerings are
not as bespoke (and therefore require less data) than is customary at Lloyd’s.
Do users somehow participate less “actively” in traditional financial marketplaces when
they enter into transactions than they do in online sharing marketplaces? The key
participation feature of online marketplaces are reviews and ratings of sellers and buyers.
Much more complex user data is shared among the specialist syndicates, brokers, and
coverholders participating in the Lloyd’s insurance market than is shared by short term
renters on a vacation rentals platform 71. And these market participants interact in more
complicated ways than do renters and owners. Moreover, Lloyd’s has now created a
mandate that syndicates enter into many of their contracts electronically over a digital
platform.72 So, using Lloyd’s as an example, it becomes difficult to see the clear distinction
between an insurance intermediation platform and, for instance, the accommodation
See
Lloyd’s,
Annual
Report,
at
3
(2017),
https://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/globalassets/documents/investors/2017/2017_lbg_annual_report_v3.
pdf (approx. 85% of the risks insured by Lloyd’s are non-UK risks).
69
See id. (only 13% of the capital in the Lloyd’s market comes from the UK insurance industry).
70
Lloyd’s, Lloyd’s in the US, 2 (2016), https://www.lloyds.com/lloyds-around-the-world/americas/ushomepage/about-us.
71
Or, as HMT puts it user participation in reviewing and rating “services provided by third parties is crucial
in regulating what appears on the platform and establishing an important trust mechanism for other users.”
HMT Position Paper Update, supra note 63, ¶ 2.24.
72
See Lloyd’s, Market Bulletin Y5170:
Electronic Placement Mandate (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.lloyds.com/market-resources/requirements-and-standards/electronic-placement.
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intermediation platform represented by Airbnb. It is true that historically one business
(reinsurance) was globalized before the advent of the internet while the other (home
rentals) was not. And historically underwriters sometimes exchanged views offline, while
renters often found it hard to exchange views at all. However, now both businesses are
globalized, users on both the buy side and the sell side share their views with one another
in both industries, and one industry is fully digitalized while the other is working to move
in that direction. It seems intellectually unsustainable to claim there is a relevant difference
with respect to user participation between the accommodation traded on Airbnb and
bespoke products traded electronically in financial markets.
The Internet of Things (“IoT”) is likely to make the distinction between businesses with
network effects and multisided business models and more ‘traditional” business even
harder to maintain. IoT refers to the network of physical objects embedded with sensors
and network connectivity that allows the collection and exchange of data. Such sensors
are becoming ubiquitous in the devices we encounter in our daily environment. A large
number of IoT applications are being developed in various domains by start-ups, SMEs,
and large MNCs alike. 73
One widely discussed IoT example is the idea of the “connected car.” Connected cars are
likely to feature seats that face a windshield that is akin to a computer screen. 74 Trends in
automotive research and development involve navigation and entertainment display
screens built into the dashboard to offer internet-based information and media, as well as
sensors intended to pick up information from roads and other networked cars. On one
model of what constitutes “active user participation,” a connected car would have all the
components for user participation in place. The user would provide geo proximity data by
driving, financial information by leasing, and be in a car that acts as a channel to deliver
advertising to a “captive” recipient.
On another model, use of a connected car would not constitute “active user participation”
because the user of a connected car would not be actively writing a message or rating a
product or service. In that case, however, clicks on a social media platform would also
seem to constitute “passive” user participation. It seems inconceivable that “going” to a
website or “searching” virtually should be classified as active user participation but going
somewhere physically should be classified as passive activity.
Some projections suggest that there will be more than thirty billion IoT devices in use by
2020. 75 In addition to connected cars, commercial and industrial applications, driven
See, e.g., Thibault Degrande, Frederic Vannieuwenborg, Sofie Verbrugge & Didier Colle, “Multi-sided
Platforms for the Internet of Things,” 372-81 (2018).
74
For high-level discussion, see, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2017 Automotive Industry Trends: The
future depends on improving returns on capital (2017), https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/2017Automotive-Industry-Trends.pdf.
75
Chin-Lung Hsu & Judy Chuan-Chuan Lin, An empirical examination of consumer adoption of Internet of
Things services: Network externalities and concern for information privacy perspectives, in 62 Computers
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largely by building automation, industrial automation, and lighting, are projected to
account for many of the new connected devices coming into use between 2018 and 2030. 76
If those projections come to pass, it is hard to imagine that user participation in historically
non-digital sectors will not exceed any de minimis user participation threshold.
In sum, it does not seem intellectually defensible to suggest that users only meaningfully
contribute to value creation in the context of certain digital platforms, or to think that the
boundaries of the idea are clear enough to allow for anything approaching reasonable
implementation. Indeed, as articulated thus far it is difficult to view the proposal as
anything other than either a) ill-conceived or b) transparently instrumentalist and
mercantilist.
But understanding the user participation perspective remains important. For one thing, the
user participation proposal highlights the political angle much of Europe brings to the
current digital tax debate. Even more importantly, HMT and the Commission have both
suggested that when “active user participation” is present, “jurisdictions in which users are
located should be entitled to tax a portion of those businesses’ profits.” 77 HMT wishes to
achieve this result using what is in effect a formulary system. 78 The Commission proposes
doing so based on a facts and circumstances arm’s length analysis of the value of user
participation.79 Either way, these proposals seek to allocate some (although not all) of the
excess return of a business to the destination jurisdiction. And that issue – destinationbased income taxation – lies at the heart of the intellectual debate about the future of the
corporate income tax as applied cross-border.
Indeed, the core of Part III is a discussion of a proposal for allocating excess returns through
a reform of the international tax system that would create a hybrid between a destinationbased income tax and the present residence-based system. Such a system would, like the
user participation proposals, allocate a part of the excess return of a business to market
(“user”) jurisdictions. Thus, the second key question regarding a user participation
proposal, namely, how, across the whole of the economy, one would determine to what
degree users contribute to “value creation,” is conceptually parallel to the question of how,
in Human Behavior 516-27 (2016). Additional projections suggest that thirty billion IoT devices by the year
2020 may be a conservative estimate. Global information firms estimate that the number of IoT devices
connected worldwide already exceeds the thirty billion threshold, see IHS Markit, IoT Trend Watch 2018, at
4 (2018), and industry professionals have proposed that the number of devices “could approach 100 billion
by the end of 2040.” See Kathryn Cave, What will the internet look like in 2040?, IDG Connect (Sept. 8,
2015), https://www.idgconnect.com/blog-abstract/10383/what-internet-look-2040.
76
Id. IHS Markit, IoT Trend Watch 2018, at 4 (2018).
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See HMT Position Paper Update, supra note 63, ¶¶ 3.62-3.75.
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European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax
on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services, COM(2018) 148 final (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/proposal_common_system_digital_services_tax_2
1032018_en.pdf. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the
corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, COM(2018) 147 final (Mar. 21, 2018),
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across the whole of the economy, one would allocate a part of the excess return to market
jurisdictions. That is the “bridge” between the user participation proposal and the
“marketing intangibles” or “DBRMPA” proposal described in Part III. Importantly, this
means that all of the technical and administrative issues that will be described in Part IIIB
below also apply in equal measure to any user participation proposal.
The principled issue is whether, how, and to what degree, across the whole of the economy,
law should allocate the excess return of a business to consumer/user/market jurisdictions
for corporate income tax purposes. The key difference between the proposal described in
Part III and the user participation theory is that the proposal in Part III does not attempt to
ring-fence the digital economy. Rather, it tackles this allocation question generally,
without resorting to unsustainable and unjustifiable distinctions in business models.
Part III. Where We Go from Here: Destination-Based Income Tax Reform?
This Part considers the “marketing intangibles” or DBRMPA idea that constitutes a
compromise between the current transfer pricing system and a destination-basis income
tax. This hybrid approach may be under consideration in some form or other at the OECD.
My formulation of this approach may or may not be the same as what is under discussion
at the OECD, as the proposal has not been publicly described in any detail. However, no
matter how a marketing intangibles concept is formulated, certain key issues will have to
be addressed. These include how to split excess returns between the current arm’s length
system and an allocation to market countries, and how to determine destination so as to
split the amount allocated to market countries among such countries.
The DBRMPA described here is a compromise between the present transfer pricing system
and a form of destination-based income tax known as a destination-based residual profit
allocation (“DBRPA”). The DBRMPA proposal divides intangible returns between those
generated by so-called “customer-based” or marketing intangibles and those generated by
other (presumably usually “production-based”) intangibles. Residual returns deemed
attributable to customer-based or marketing intangibles would be allocated to the market –
the jurisdictions where the customers reside. Residual returns deemed attributable to other
intangibles would be allocated based on current transfer pricing rules (i.e., the BLTV).
Importantly, in this sense the DBRMPA functions in the same way as user participation,
but does so across the whole economy, instead of ring-fencing this change based on a cliff
effect determined by whether a business is categorized as being “digitalized” or not.
IIIA. Background: The Destination-Based Residual Profit Allocation
The DBRPA proposal was developed by a group consisting of Alan Auerbach, Michael
Devereaux, Michael Keen, Paul Oosterhuis, Wolfgang Schön, and John Vella. The idea is
explained in the excellent paper authored by Joe Andrus and Paul Oosterhuis for this
conference in 2016 entitled “Transfer Pricing After BEPS: Where Are We and Where
Should We Be Going.” Further details appear in a presentation given by Paul Oosterhuis
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at Oxford University in 2016. 80 The proposal represents an attempt to move towards a
destination-basis corporate income tax system by means that can at least be described as
remaining consistent with some of the principles of the current “arm’s length” transfer
pricing architecture.
The DBRMPA is fundamentally a compromise between a destination-based residual profit
allocation (DBRPA) and the current transfer pricing system. Thus, analyzing the
DBRMPA first and foremost requires understanding the DBRPA. 81
The DBRPA proposal is animated by the understanding that the location of consumers is
less mobile than the location of booked profits, intellectual property, corporate assets,
corporate employees, or any other element of value creation. In this sense it is similar to
sales-based formulary apportionment. However, the DBRPA attempts to separate “excess”
or “residual” returns from “routine returns,” and provide a normal rate of return to
productive functions. The first-order advantages of a DBRPA are supposed to be reduced
incentives to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions, reduced complexity and reduced
administrative burdens.
The core idea is to salvage the existing arm’s length system with respect to routine returns,
while using a sales-based system to allocate residual returns. How would it work? To
allocate excess/residual returns, the DBRPA deems the country in which customer sales
take place to be an “entrepreneurial” affiliate with respect to local market sales, and
ascribes all “non-routine” profits to that affiliate.82 Achieving this result would require
MNCs to measure gross revenues by country and by product using some concept of
“destination” or “place of supply.” Global costs would need to be measured at a product
line level, and then either traced or apportioned out to revenues from specific countries.
The DBRPA mechanism for allocating the residual share to the market is quite similar to a
cost-sharing approach for allocating income attributed to intangibles. However, instead of
allocating the residual profit to an “entrepreneurial risk-taker” in an MNC group defined
80
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as the affiliate that owns the intangible property and takes on financial risk (as in
contemporary cost-sharing models), the residual profit is instead allocated to affiliates in
the respective market jurisdictions. The proposal in effect imposes deemed contractual
arrangements to which traditional transfer pricing methods are then applied. As a result,
the DBRPA allocates excess returns on a product line by product line basis rather than an
entity by entity basis. In doing so it appropriately escapes the “formulary apportionment”
label.
Comparison of DBRPA with Sales-Based Formulary Apportionment
The most important difference between a DBRPA and sales-based formulary
apportionment (“FA”) is that a DBRPA would modify transfer pricing methodologies so
as to allocate only “excess” or “residual” profits to the jurisdiction of sale. 83 Sales-based
formulary apportionment systems do not necessarily allocate any income to jurisdictions
where corporate functions takes place. In the US, our status as a very large market obscures
this concern that sales-based formulary apportionment raises. But consider a small
jurisdiction; let’s call it Denmark. Whatever the theoretical merits, it is probably hard for
politicians to explain to Danish taxpayers that a Danish corporation which exploits a range
of local benefits to make outputs that are wholly or almost wholly exported will pay no or
almost no corporate income tax in Denmark. The cost-plus markup on productive
functions in the DBRPA is somewhat responsive to the concern that sales-based formulary
apportionment provides no revenue to jurisdictions where economic activity takes place.
It solves the “Denmark problem” to some degree.
Although DBRPA is not a sales-based FA proposal, in many circumstances DBRPA could
produce results that are similar to the residual sales-based formulary apportionment
(“RFA”) proposal put forth by Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst in 2011. RFA would
allocate a fixed markup (7.5% in the Durst et al proposal) on costs to entities that undertake
activity within an MNC. 84 All other profits would then be allocated to the
destination/market country.
The key difference between DBRPA and RFA is that DBRPA imposes a destination-basis
allocation for residual returns on a product line by product line and individualized country
by country basis. 85 If percentage of gross sales revenue on the one hand and percentage of
corporate profit on the other vary significantly by country, DBRPA and RFA would
generate different results.86 Similarly, if average profit levels vary by product line and
some countries generate more revenue for an MNE from high-profit products while other
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countries generate more revenue for an MNE from low-profit products, DBRPA and RFA
would generate different results.87
DBRPA requires determining where sales occur. Andrus and Oosterhuis correctly observe
that using location of sales to allocate income “raises several particularly difficult issues, 81
including: the treatment of remote sales, the treatment of sales through intermediaries, the
treatment of sales of raw materials, components and intermediate goods, the treatment of
capital goods sales and the treatment of services.” 88 At minimum, addressing these issues
would require augmented information exchange and potentially some degree of collection
assistance. These issues also have first-order ramifications for DBRMPA, and so are
addressed further below. Another important issue discussed below is that, like both salesbased formulary apportionment and RFA, DBRPA likely requires countries to agree on
rules that define the corporate income tax base.
Other technical questions also arise in thinking about DBRPA. 89 Such issues include the
treatment of losses, the treatment of flow-through entities, the treatment of certain financial
transactions, and the treatment of M&A. In addition, financial accounting treatment may
be problematic, and there are important questions about the compatibility of these ideas
with tax treaties and international trade commitments. These issues were outlined in the
2016 Andrus and Oosterhuis effort. I do not rehash that discussion below, although these
concerns may be relevant to a DBRMPA as well.
IIIB. Destination-Based Residual Marketing Profit Allocation
A DBRMPA has the same starting point as a DBRPA: affiliates of an MNE are
compensated for their functions on a cost plus or return on assets basis using arm’s length
principles. Unlike in the DBRPA, however, the “residual return” must then be divided
between marketing or customer-based intangibles and other intangibles. This division is
necessary in order to then allocate income deemed to arise from customer-based or
marketing intangibles to the market of destination for the good or service, while allocating
the remaining residual return under existing transfer pricing principles.
Going forward in this Part I will use the term “marketing intangibles.” There may very
well be a substantive distinction between marketing intangibles and customer-based
intangibles. For example, in the US core deposits of a financial institution were historically
thought of as a “customer-based” intangible, but might not be a marketing intangible.
Similarly, the value of a “network effect” might be considered a “customer-based”
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intangible but not a marketing intangible.90 However, in this discussion I explicitly do not
intend to invoke such substantive distinctions. I am simply choosing a single term
(marketing intangibles) for ease of exposition. 91
The conceptual motivation for the DBRMPA derives from at least two sources. First, some
believe certain export-driven jurisdictions would adamantly reject a DBRPA. However, at
least two of the most prominent of these jurisdictions, Germany and Japan, may believe
that the intangible value held by their domestically-headquartered corporations derives
primarily from production intangibles rather than from marketing intangibles. Thus, these
jurisdictions (the theory presumably goes) might be willing to accept a DBRMPA. Second,
some policymakers may believe that marketing intangibles are fundamentally “customerbased,” and therefore more appropriately allocated to jurisdictions of destination (“the
market”) than is income attributable to other intangibles.
Both of these premises are subject to doubt. For purposes of this paper, however, I will set
those two questions aside and limit myself to administrative and pragmatic issues
associated with the DBRMPA. This drafting decision is not because I’m persuaded by the
premises described above.
The DBRMPA raises three basic administrative concerns. First, it retains all of the
problems of current transfer pricing law, because with respect to residual returns that are
not allocated to the marketing intangibles current law applies. Second, the proposal
imposes an inadministrable distinction between residual returns associated with marketing
intangibles and other residual returns. Third, since a DBRMPA allocates residual returns
associated with marketing intangibles to the market jurisdiction, all the challenges
associated with any destination-basis income tax proposal are present in the DBRMPA.
The problems of current transfer pricing law are well-known, and were also discussed in
Part IA. Part IIIB.1. discusses historical evidence suggesting that the distinction between
marketing intangibles and other intangibles is not administrable, and also considers various
potential solutions to that concern. Part IIIB.2. discusses the difficulties associated with
determining destination for purposes of allocating revenues in a destination-basis income
tax. There are two sub-issues. First, mechanisms used in the VAT to determine destination
do not work in an income tax. Second, solutions to determine destination by building on
existing income tax-based concepts are insufficiently robust. Part IIIB.3. describes the
difficulties that arise because the DBRMPA relies on unitary tax principles for purposes of
allocating costs, but not for purposes of determining revenues. Part IIIB.4. concludes that
the DBRMPA, while it seems attractive as a political compromise at 100,000 feet, entails
a level of complexity and embedded sources for further conflict as between sovereigns and
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Oosterhuis & Parsons, Destination-Based Income Taxation: Neither Principled nor Practical?, 71 Tax.
L. Rev. 515 (2018).
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Indeed the term “marketing intangible” seems like a bit of a misnomer to me; the term “market
intangible” might be more appropriate. Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion I use the term “marketing
intangible” because it is the one that has been used most often in the current debate.
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as between sovereigns and multinationals that is problematic. It also would require a
significant degree of international tax harmonization.
IIIB.1. Dividing a Residual Return Between Marketing-Based and Other
Intangibles
The DBRMPA raises an important and likely technically irresolvable point of controversy:
the extent to which residual returns are attributable to customer-based or other intangible
assets.
A legislative definition of “marketing” or “customer-based” intangibles would presumably
be required to operationalize a basic DBRMPA proposal. One could certainly imagine
such definitions. For example, a statute might define income associated with patents,
copyrights, trade secrets, and any other intangible clearly related to product function or
composition as “production-based” intangible income, and specify that all other income
not allocated to a routine return was “marketing intangible” income. Alternatively, a
statute could define marketing intangibles to include trademarks, tradenames, and
franchises as well as the value of installed customer bases, expectation of future business
from that base, and goodwill and going concern value.
A working legislative definition does not solve the underlying valuation problem.
Conceptually the DBRMPA requires valuation of all “marketing intangibles” as distinct
from all other intangibles in order to produce a ratio via which all residual income could
be divided between marketing intangible income (which in this usage can equivalently be
called “customer-based intangible income”) and other intangible income.
This issue – distinguishing between customer-based intangibles and other intangibles – is
not new for US law. Prior to enactment of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, many categories of intangibles were eligible for income forecast depreciation, often
on accelerated schedules.92 As a result the value of customer-based intangibles as opposed
to patents and other intangibles acquired in various transactions had to be determined.
Amortization deductions before 1993 depended on the acquirer’s ability to establish that
an acquired intangible had a limited useful life that could be established with reasonable
accuracy and an ascertainable value separate from goodwill, since goodwill was
nonamortizable. 93 Amortizable intangibles were then amortized under various useful lives.
In contrast, section 197 spreads amortization over a 15-year straight line period, without
regard to their “type.” Section 197 obviates the need to ascertain individual valuations for
different categories of intangibles, and greatly diminishes the incentive taxpayers once had
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to characterize acquired intangibles as assets distinguishable from goodwill and going
concern value.
Fred Goldberg, a former Commissioner of the IRS, explained the administrative problem
created by prior law to Congress in 1992, shortly after he left the job of Commissioner of
the IRS and became the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. He testified
that the need to allocate basis among purchased intangibles not only resulted in substantial
uncertainty and dissimilar treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, but also imposed large
wasteful transaction and administrative costs on taxpayers and the government. Before
1993, disputes over the amortization of customer-based or market-based intangibles,
including but not limited to items such as core deposits held by financial institutions,
insurance expirations, and newspaper and magazine subscription lists, produced many
prominent, large dollar litigations. 94 As one author described the problem, “the
governance of purchase price allocations to intangible assets [has become] an
administrative quagmire and a judicial disaster.”95
For tax years between 1979 and 1987, for all unresolved audit cases (on any issue) in
examination, appeals, or litigation as of mid 1989, in fully 70 percent of those cases in
which taxpayers claimed that an intangible assets had a determinable useful life over which
amortization was available, the IRS proposed adjustments and claimed that the assets were
in fact goodwill.96 Moreover, for that same period, the single category of intangible assets
over which this dispute arose most often were customer or market-based intangibles.97 The
debate before 1993 regarding acquired intangibles largely focused on distinguishing
between customer-based intangibles and goodwill, the latter of which was not amortizable
under pre-1993 law. But the core problem was allocating purchase price premia across
intangible asset categories generally.
This same issue – whether an intangible is a customer or market-based intangible or some
other intangible (goodwill or something else) would arise in a new guise in a regime that
distinguishes between “marketing intangibles” and other intangibles. As long as one result
is more favorable for the taxpayer on the one hand or the government on the other, or for
one government or another, incentives for controversies regarding classification arise. But
relative to pre-1993 US law, the difference would be that instead of being limited to cases
where intangibles were acquired, the controversy would arise with respect to every single
cross-border transaction in which a non-routine return existed. The intangible
94
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classification incentive of a foreign sovereign where any DEMPE functions took place and
the incentives of the IRS would always be at cross-purposes. To paraphrase Fred
Goldberg’s 1992 congressional testimony regarding the analogous issue a generation ago,
if we go down this path, “[n]o amount of after the fact enforcement and litigation can
possibly remedy the situation.” 98 We will have re-created a mess from a generation ago
and compounded it exponentially.
IIIB.1.a. A “Two Sided” Valuation Solution?
Another key difficulty with a DBRMPA arises from the fact that, like the DBRPA, this is
a transactional method. The DPRMPA therefore has the complexity associated with
determining profit levels on a product line by product line and country-by-country basis.
However, the DBRMPA differs from the DBRPA in that it requires a profit split of the
residual profit being allocated for each transaction between profits attributed to marketing
intangibles and other residual profits. A methodology must be chosen to undertake this
profit split.99 In transfer pricing terms, on first impression a DBRMPA would seem to
require application of the transactional profit split method to all transactions, even where
only one party makes unique and valuable contributions.
We’ve spent years in transfer pricing trying to limit the use of the transactional profit split
method. The OECD’s recent guidance on the application of the transactional profit split
explains why: “[a] weakness of the transactional profit split method relates to difficulties
in its application.” 100 As a result, the OECD perspective is that “where the accurate
delineation of the transaction determines that one party to the transaction performs only
simple functions, does not assume economically significant risks in relation to the
transaction and does not otherwise make any contribution which is unique and valuable, a
transactional profit split method typically would not be appropriate.” 101 For the same
reason, the OECD maintains that “a lack of comparables alone is insufficient to warrant
the use of a transactional profit split.”102
In various high-profile cases over the years, the application of the transactional profit split
produced highly intractable disputes between taxpayers and governments and between
98
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competent authorities in governments. One well-remembered example is the IRS transfer
pricing dispute with Glaxo SmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. & Subsidiaries (“GSK”)
for the tax years 1989-2005.103 The essence of the dispute was over the level of US profits
reported by GSK after making intercompany payments that needed to take into account
production intangibles developed by and trademarks owned by its UK parent, relative to
the value of GSK’s marketing intangibles in the US.104
The facts of the GSK case required coordination between the US and the UK with respect
to what current OECD transfer pricing guidelines would describe as a two-sided
transactional profit split. The public record suggests the UK government never acceded to
the US assertion as to the share of the GSK profits that were attributable to US marketing
intangibles rather than UK production intangibles. 105 The GSK case is particularly wellremembered, and the size of the dispute was unusual, but the basic setup is not unique.
Two-sided transactional profit splits lend themselves to requiring intergovernmental
coordination through MAP to avoid double juridical taxation. Even after the BEPS project
and the advent of the multilateral instrument, mandatory binding arbitration is still
available only in a limited set of MAP cases, and the risk of failures of MAP coordination
remains high in transactional profit splits. Sometimes, maybe this is just the way it has to
be. But why would we want to adopt an international tax system that sets up this exact
type of dispute between taxpayers and governments and as between national tax
administrations in every case; including in the broad swath of cases where everyone
previously agreed the transactional profit split method had no relevance?106
IIIB.1.b. A Relative “Capitalized Expenditure” Approach?
Another potential approach to splitting residual profit between profits being allocated to
marketing intangibles and profits being allocated to other intangibles could involve
specifying which expenditures contribute to developing marketing intangibles and which
expenditures contribute to developing other intangibles. Governments would then
presumably establish “useful lives” for various buckets of expenditure. The resulting
relative “capitalized values” associated with marketing intangibles as compared to other
103
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intangibles would produce a ratio. The ratio would change each year as a result of both
new expenditures by the MNC and the operation of whatever “amortization schedule” was
adopted for the various buckets of expenditure. The “amortization schedule” would not
produce actual deductions; it would simply establish the annual ratio of “marketing
intangibles” to “other intangibles.” That ratio (as it adjusted each year, presumably on a
product line by product line basis), would provide the ratio of excess return to be allocated
through the current arm’s length system as opposed to being assigned to market
jurisdictions for each specified product line.
Something akin to this approach is said to have been used in some advanced pricing
agreements entered into by some multinationals both with the IRS and with foreign tax
administrations. But generalizing this approach would be very resource intensive.
Moreover, the approach transmutes the debate as to what constitutes a “marketing” or
“customer-based” intangible as opposed to other intangibles into a debate as to what costs
develop a “marketing intangible” and what costs develop other intangibles (e.g. production
intangibles) and what the respective useful lives of such expenditures should be. 107 It is
unclear to me that this represents a meaningful improvement on the basic two-sided
DBRMPA method described in Part IIIB.1.a. above. It certainly highlights the relationship
between the problem of relative valuation in a DBRMPA and the useful life issues section
197 was enacted to eliminate.
Finally, the relative capitalized expenditure approach is hard to translate into the context
of the digital business models that are at the heart of this debate. Which expenditures can
be attributed to creating “network effects,” and thereby a form of “marketing intangible?”
Considered prima facie as an intellectual matter, arguably few or none. But is that an
answer that would be globally accepted?
IIIB.1.c. A “One-Sided” Valuation Solution?
The central problem described above in Parts IIIB.1.a. and IIIB.1.b. arises as a result of the
attempt to put relative values on the intangibles associated with “marketing intangibles” as
compared to other intangibles. Again, in IIIB.1.a. valuing “marketing intangibles” and
“other intangibles” respectively is just a mechanism to create the ratio of excess return to
be allocated through the current arm’s length system as opposed to being assigned to
market jurisdictions. IIIB.1.b., produces the same ratio through a relative “capitalized
asset” approach.
Another alternative to resolve the relative valuation marketing intangible/other intangible
allocation problem would be to value the excess return that should be ascribed to
107
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specifically listed production intangibles. The system could then allocate the residual –
that is to say, the excess return remaining after subtracting the return given to non-routine
production intangibles – to the “marketing bucket” and assign it to market jurisdictions on
a destination-basis.
This one-sided DBRMPA method would avoid the problem described in Parts IIIB.1.a. and
IIIB.1.b. with respect to dividing residual returns between marketing intangibles (the
market) and other intangibles (the current transfer pricing system) using a ratio. Instead,
one could imagine using a one-sided method by attempting to locate a comparable
uncontrolled transaction for non-routine production intangibles,108 or by applying a profit
indicator, for example a return on costs associated with specified production intangibles
(or some other net profit indicator).
This latter approach (a one-sided profit indicator approach) is similar to the OECD’s
“transactional net margin method” (“TNMM”) (known in the US as a comparable profits
method), but with one important difference. The OECD transfer pricing guidelines specify
that a TNMM is only supposed to be applied when one of the two parties owns and controls
all the relevant non-routine intangibles.
MNCs would be incentivized to adapt tax planning to a one-sided DBRMPA, which would
value the return to “marketing intangibles” as a residual after a return is ascribed to nonroutine production intangibles. In a one-sided DBRMPA world with DEMPE rules (i.e.
the BLTV) for the allocation of the return ascribed to production intangibles, MNCs would
seek to a) locate their production intangibles in low tax jurisdictions and b) maximize the
valuations for their production intangibles. Nevertheless, because excess returns are so
large for the world’s leading companies, the one-sided methodology DBRMPA, which
ascribes a specified return to production intangibles and gives everything else to the
market, would likely allocate most (high) excess returns to the market/marketing
intangibles.
A one-sided DBRMPA methodology that values only specified production intangibles is
intellectually distinguishable from a DBRPA. However, as a practical matter the one-sided
DBRMPA produces a result that asymptotically approaches the outcome in a DBRPA. It
also has all the issues associated with determining destination in DBRPA, without
achieving one of the DBRPA’s virtues, which is eliminating the administrative problems
associated with current transfer pricing law.
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It should also be noted that the reason the DBRPA is not currently under consideration
internationally does not appear to be related to whether it is normatively defensible.
Rather, the DBRPA is not part of the debate because it is politically unpalatable to a number
of major jurisdictions and other constituencies that oppose allocating all or most of the
residual return from intangible assets to market jurisdictions. The one-sided DBRMPA
methodology could be politically unpalatable to those same jurisdictions and other
constituencies.
Finally, one should note that the one-sided DBRMPA methodology described above is in
some sense the inverse of the “digital investment” idea put forth by Wolfgang Schön.109
Schön’s idea treats “digital investment” as the functional equivalent of the “marketing
intangible” in the DBRMPA. Schön suggests that market-specific digital investment
should be measured, and the return associated with that investment should be valued using
a TNMM-type approach and allocated to market jurisdictions. How that measurement
would be accomplished is not entirely clear, but Schön’s idea is quite interesting. It could
be integrated into the current transfer pricing system more easily than any DBRMPA
concept. And the digital investment concept certainly would not asymptotically approach
a DBRPA. It is unclear whether the Schön’s proposal is being considered as a mechanism
to implement the marketing intangibles idea. However, the terminology used by Schön
and the terminology that has been used publicly to date in the marketing intangibles
discussion do not overlap.
IIIB.1.d. A “Formulary DBRMPA” Solution?
Some might acknowledge the problems of allocating between production intangibles and
marketing intangibles based on either a “two-sided” or a “one-sided” transfer pricing
method, and then suggest that the issue should simply be resolved by agreeing a percentage
allocation to the market. For instance, governments could agree that distinguishing
between market intangibles and other intangibles was not systematically administrable, and
therefore the excess return should just be divided based on fixed percentages (50/50)
between market jurisdictions and the existing arm’s length standard (the BLTV). A
formulary approach clearly does address the allocation problems described above with
respect to the DBRMPA as between marketing intangibles and other intangibles. Moreover,
it does so without asymptotically approaching a DBRPA.
However, formulary DBRMPA likely raises the issues traditional formulary apportionment
raised in the United States. In other words, because activity is mobile, but sales are not,
jurisdictions would be incentivized to abandon a 50/50 split and move in the direction of a
100% allocation to destination.
US states use a formulary apportionment system to determine their taxable share of USsource corporate profits. The basic mechanics of a formulary apportionment system, in
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which intercompany transactions are generally ignored, are thus familiar to most US tax
lawyers. A generation ago US state corporate tax apportionment formulas were based on
a weighted average of the shares of sales, payroll, and assets in the state. 110 However, these
formulas create an implicit excise tax on the factors used in the formula. 111 As a result, the
three-factor formula discourages MNCs from investing in assets or generating employment
in high-tax locations.
Over the years the states of the United States shifted (in inconsistent ways) away from
three-factor apportionment towards sales-only apportionment factors to gain a competitive
advantage in attracting tangible investment and jobs. 112 In the international setting, with
higher tax rates than state income taxes and fewer coordination mechanisms to limit
competition, most serious commentators agree that this dynamic would be more intense.
Moreover, customers are much less mobile than employment in the cross-border setting,
so economic theory would suggest that a sales-based apportionment should produce fewer
economic distortions than an apportionment formula that took location of employment into
account.113
Formulary DBRMPA would crystalize the problems of the BLTV. Research consistently
shows that high skilled – DEMPE-capable – labor is the most mobile form of labor globally
(certainly more mobile than the payroll and assets factors of traditional formulary
apportionment). Meanwhile consumers are quite immobile. The dichotomy between an
apportionment factor that is immobile and an apportionment factor that is highly mobile,
with fixed percentages to each, creates an implicit excise tax on the mobile factor. That
reality would likely push countries in the direction of unilaterally choosing a 100%
allocation to the immobile factor (the location of the consumer), in order to eliminate the
implicit excise tax on high-skilled jobs that the 50/50 split would create, just as US states
over-weighted sales and abandoned the payroll factor to encourage job creation in their
jurisdictions. Moreover, in the international system, even more than at the level of the US
states, it is not clear what enforcement mechanisms exist to ensure that countries abide by
an agreed 50/50 split. Bilateral tax treaties are not well-suited to enshrining such an
approach.
The one potential solution I see to the pressures created by the formulary DBRMPA’s
implicit excise tax on DEMPE jobs in higher tax jurisdictions is to abandon the BLTV.
Governments could decide to revert to pre-BEPS transfer pricing guidelines for the part of
the excess return attributed to other intangibles and allocated under transfer pricing rules.
In that world, contractual allocations of risk would be more fully respected and income
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shifting for the “other intangibles” portion of excess returns would be somewhat easier than
under current law. But shifting income would not require shifting well-paying (and highly
mobile) jobs out of higher tax jurisdictions. Reverting to the pre-BEPS transfer pricing
guidelines therefore would reduce the otherwise inevitable pressure for countries to
unilaterally move from a DBRMPA to a 100% allocation of the excess return to the market
jurisdiction.
IIIB.2. Problems with Relying on Destination for Income Tax Purposes
In any system that allocates part of the return to the market (in other words, any
“destination-basis” system) the tax burden is meant to rest in the jurisdiction of the final
consumer, rather than the jurisdiction of residence of any intermediaries in the supply
chain. The economic rationale for this result is that the final consumer is thought to be the
least mobile factor. Thus, from a theoretical economics perspective, a destination-basis
system is less economically distortive than other more mobile bases for assessing corporate
tax.114
However, if the administrative mechanism for measuring the location of sales does not
conform to the location of the final consumer, this justification for attempting to tax at
destination is undermined. Importantly, multinationals can easily structure their transfer
pricing arrangements to book sales income in a jurisdiction that is not the jurisdiction of
residence of the final consumer and are incentivized to do so if they can lower their tax
burden as a result.
The US international income tax system has been cognizant of this category of issue for
decades; it is at the heart of both the 20th century understanding of section 482 and the 1962
foreign base company sales income rules.
For the same reason, every destination-basis income tax proposal relies on a concept of
destination separate and apart from the contractual decision MNCs make about where to
book sales. Andrus and Oosterhuis, as well as other commentators, in effect suggest that
concepts for determining destination that have evolved outside the United States for
purposes of implementing the value-added tax might be modified for purposes of
administering a DBRMPA.115 The VAT does effectively establish destination by means
of proxies and administrative solutions in the consumption tax context in most cases. The
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difficulty is that the mechanisms the VAT uses for this purpose simply are not amenable
to implementation in an income tax. 116
IIIB.2.a. Inapplicability of VAT Best Practices
The VAT generally resolves the issue of determining destination using the credit-invoice
mechanism. Two of the most important features of the credit-invoice mechanism are
taxation on gross amounts and imposition of tax on every transfer, both intra-firm and interfirm.
An income tax cannot adopt the credit-invoice mechanism for one key reason: income
taxes tax net income, rather than gross revenues. In an income tax cross-border business
input purchases are generally deductible. In contrast, the VAT establishes destination in
large measure by providing cross-border business input purchases a treatment that is the
equivalent of non-deductibility.117
Destination of Goods
For tangible goods, VAT laws generally assess VAT using frontier or border controls.118
Imported goods are in effect treated as having the destination of the jurisdiction where they
clear customs. VAT is assessed on the full value of the good as it enters the jurisdiction.
VAT laws then free exports of VAT through a combination of non-inclusion of proceeds
and a refund mechanism for VAT previously paid. As a result, the VAT avoids the
difficulties a destination-basis income tax would have with cross-border sales through third
party intermediaries.
The reason third party cross-border intermediation does not obscure destination in the VAT
is that the intermediary pays a full tax on its purchases, and has the full amount refunded
116
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amount of VAT paid to other registered businesses in purchasing business inputs (intermediate goods,
services, plant and equipment, etc.). The credit eliminates the VAT on goods and services used by a
registered business, but leaves in place the VAT on sales to final consumers. This mechanism ensures that
the consumption of all goods and services subject to the VAT will be taxed once, but only once, generally at
the consumer level. Imposing the VAT on a destination-basis requires a border adjustment. To eliminate
the tax paid on an exported good by businesses at earlier stages in the production and distribution process,
exporters receive a credit (and therefore perhaps a refund) for tax paid on their inputs in a credit-invoice
method system, while no tax is assessed on their sales.
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The VAT mechanism works cross-border and is not equivalent to a tariff because the VAT credit
mechanism then provides a credit to registered businesses (and not to consumers). The whole tax is passed
on to consumers; businesses bear none of it. In contrast, in an income tax, businesses are intended to pay
tax. As a result, the full credit mechanism is not an option in an income tax.
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VAT on imports is generally collected at the same time as customs duties, although in some countries
collection is postponed until declared on the importer’s next VAT return.
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on re-export. Exports are not included in the tax base, and then a tax based on the sales
price of the good is collected at the jurisdiction of (further) destination. A similar result
applies with respect to importation of intermediate inputs (whether raw materials,
components, or intermediate goods) that are subsequently exported as part of a different
tangible good, and (thanks to expensing) even with respect to capital goods that are
purchased to allow for the manufacture of other products for export. 119 In all cases the
credit-input system thereby moves the tax burden to the final buyer.
This VAT system for ensuring that tax is collected at destination only works because the
system taxes on a gross basis and refunds on every intra-firm and inter-firm transfer. An
income tax cannot adopt this basic element of the credit-invoice mechanism as it operates
in cross-border situations and remain a tax on net income. As a result, the VAT does not
provide useful guidance for resolving problems of destination of goods in an income tax
system.
Location of Services
Determining the destination of cross-border trade in services and intangibles more
generally has been a key issue in reforming the VAT for the 21st century. 120 Since there
are no customs controls to impose the VAT at the point of importation on services and
intangibles, creating administrable proxies for the destination principle in services and
intangibles is challenging. The OECD has developed special guidelines for determining
the jurisdiction of taxation for international supplies of services and intangibles over the
last decade that attempt to reflect the destination principle.
Determining the location of services raises especially difficult issues in the MNC
context.121 In many cases, MNC service recipients utilize the services of a service provider
in multiple jurisdictions. The country that the services are billed to can become a
mechanism for manipulation in a DBRMPA.
Charge-out mechanisms of the kind used in today’s income tax system can and do
conceptually resolve the problem of determining the destination of services an MNC
recipient receives and uses in multiple locations in the VAT context. 122 However, the
difficulty raised by this solution for tax administrations in the DBRMPA context is
119

Of course, income taxes cannot provide expensing treatment in all cases while maintaining their status as
income taxes.
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Walter Hellerstein & Michael Keen, Interjurisdictional Issues in the Design of a VAT, 63 Tax L. Rev. 359
(2010).
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See Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promised Pitfalls of Adopting Unitary Formulary
Apportionment, 61 Tax L. Rev. 169, at 208 (2008) and Hellerstein, supra note 110, at 9-12, for a discussion
of these issues.
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Note also that to solve the problem of determining where globally-provided MNC to MNC services are
“consumed,” most VATs today generally follow the result achieved for purpose of corporate income tax
chargeouts. It is obviously no answer to rely on the VAT to solve an income tax problem if the present law
VAT solution is to rely on the income tax answer to solve that same problem.
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different and should not be trivialized. Tax administrations would need to audit service
recipients to determine whether charge-outs had been made appropriately in order to
inform their audit of the service provider. While charge outs can be a subject of audit in
today’s income tax system, tax administrators never need to ask whether charge outs by an
unrelated party change the tax result for a separate, unrelated taxpayer. The level of
internal coordination such a system would require of government auditors simply does not
exist today within tax administrations.
IIIB.2.b. Known Solutions Building on Income Tax Administrative Concepts Are
Insufficiently Robust
As noted above, sales through third party distributors would raise substantial avoidance
and/or enforcement issues for a DBRMPA. Since the administrative features of the VAT
cannot help, other anti-abuse rules would be needed in a DBRMPA to address the tax
incentive to structure operations to have customers purchase products through a third-party
distributor in a low-tax jurisdiction. Most likely some type of look-through rule would be
required.123 However, making a look-through rule work would require reporting by third
party distributing purchasers. Andrus and Oosterhuis imagine implementation of this sort
of system in the context of single-factor sales apportionment. 124
Getting buy-sell arrangements with third party distributors to be treated equivalently to
related party distribution arrangements or third-party agency distribution arrangements
would be challenging. In theory, a DBRMPA would also need similar look-through rules
to allocate revenue from sales of intermediate inputs to third party manufacturers. Ideally
these sales would be allocated on a look-through basis based on the country of sale of the
end good into which intermediate goods are ultimately incorporated. However, because
this structure is infeasible, Andrus and Oosterhuis recommend treating the place where the
goods are incorporated into products of the purchaser as the location of sale. 125 The sale
of capital goods raises a more extreme version of the same problem – these are in effect
the sale of intermediary goods with a long useful life the value of which is then embedded
in end consumer goods and services.
Andrus and Oosterhuis suggest that to prevent rampant abuse, we would need to distinguish
between “real” manufacturing and mere re-importation or packaging (this would backstop
the look-through rule for distributing purchasers). As they wrote “[t]he location, for
example, of the final packaging or labeling of products can too easily be manipulated if a
significant tax advantage results.” They then suggest the contract manufacturing rules
(which distinguish manufacturing from repackaging) might be used to address this concern.

123

Clausing & Avi-Yonah proposed a look-through rule for unrelated distributors in their single sales factor
formulary apportionment proposal. Kim Clausing & Reuven Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in
a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, Brookings Inst., June 2007.
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Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 81, at 101.
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Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra note 81, at 100. See also Harry Grubert, Destination-Based Income Taxes:
A Mismatch Made in Heaven, 69 Tax L. Rev. 43, at 55-56 (2015).
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Those familiar with the difficulties in administering and unintended planning engendered
by the contract manufacturing rules might be concerned about adopting a facts and
circumstances test for all cross-border transactions, rather than the occasional instance of
foreign base company sales income. However, the primary problem is a deeper one: in
this case the jurisdiction in which a tax administration would need to audit the question of
whether real manufacturing had occurred would often be a jurisdiction in which the MNC
under audit has no physical presence. And, as with the location of service use discussed in
IIIB.2.a., tax administrations would again be in the position of auditing one business to
figure out where taxing rights lie for the profits of an unrelated corporation. Absent a
radically improved and streamlined environment for both information exchange and
international tax administrative assistance, how are the arising enforcement questions
supposed to be addressed? Licensing arrangements and franchising structures raise parallel
but – from an audit perspective – perhaps more complicated questions than those described
above for 3rd party intermediary sales.126
IIIB.2.c. Other Methods of Identifying Destination
There may be mechanisms outside historic VAT or income tax practice to identify the
destination of some goods and services. Two examples that come to mind are
pharmaceutical products and technology that has an IP address. In the pharmaceutical
industry for non-tax regulatory reasons businesses generally must keep track of the
destination of their products even when those products are being distributed by third party
distributors. An IP address can be used as a proxy for location, so a DBRMPA could
potentially treat goods that have an IP address as having the destination associated with
their IP address.
The question that then arises is whether destination can be determined using such non-tax
proxies for most, some, or only a low percentage of goods and services that generate excess
returns. The answer to this question is unclear. What is certain is that the destination of
all goods that generate excess returns is not determinable based on piggybacking on nontax regulatory rules or relying on IP addresses.
IIIB.2.d. Relationship Between FDII and any Destination-Based Allocation System
Interestingly, the IRS and the US Treasury are likely to put all the above-discussed
concepts for determining destination to the test. New section 250 of the Code (“FDII”) in
effect establishes a preferential tax rate for income derived by domestic corporations from
serving foreign markets. The statutory rules require determining the foreign portion of
deduction eligible income. This amount includes income derived from the sale of property
to any foreign person for a foreign use. It also includes income derived in connection with
services provided to any person not located within the United States, or with respect to
property that is not located in the United States. Thus, the destination of both goods and
services must be determined in order to implement the new FDII rules of section 250. The
126

Some of these difficulties are discussed in Grubert, supra note 125, at 57.
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IRS and the Treasury will need to write regulations describing how taxpayers should make
these determinations in the coming twelve months in order to implement the FDII regime.
Any multilateral organization or foreign sovereign evaluating a proposal for a DBRMPA
would therefore be well-advised to evaluate the regulatory output of the IRS and the
Treasury in this regard.
IIIB.3. Problems with Unitary Approach
As discussed earlier, a DBRMPA relies on the DBRPA with respect to the portion of the
excess return of the MNC allocated to marketing intangibles. The DBRPA in turn is not a
formulary system, because it measures returns at a product line level and provides
jurisdictions “credit” for higher prices. However, escaping the formulary label does not
equate to escaping the related “unitary” label. The DBRPA calculates most revenues at a
country level, but it calculates costs on a global consolidated basis, just like the “unitary”
aspect of formulary apportionment.
An important downside of global consolidation is that it requires a common measure of
taxable income across jurisdictions. In other words, one needs a single measurement of
apportionable income. That is the “unitary” aspect of formulary apportionment.
DBRMPA may not require a common measure of gross income, but it would require
common rules regarding costs. The most obvious category of costs that need common
allocation rules are indirect costs. The problems of indirect cost allocation are familiar to
US practitioners from the foreign tax credit system and our current debates about the GILTI.
A DBRMPA would need globally agreed rules about analogous difficult issues. 127
Moreover, for the DBRPA to work well, schedules for depreciation or amortization of
tangible and intangible property, treatment of original issue discount – and perhaps even
issues like the method used for inventorying costs or the treatment of fines and penalties –
would ideally be standardized across jurisdictions. As Julie Roin explained a decade ago
with respect to formulary apportionment, unitary systems become inadministrable if global
costs must be measured for purposes of determining income in each jurisdiction, but each
jurisdiction has its own rules with respect to when those global costs are taken into
account.128
These issues with the “unitary” dimension of formulary apportionment are well-trodden
ground. What observers may not appreciate is that the DBRMPA does not avoid those
issues. Indeed, because the DBRMPA requires allocating indirect costs on a product line
basis rather than a QBU basis, the unitary concerns that require tax harmonization to
address may be more extensive than under formulary apportionment.
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Cf. OECD Action 10, supra note 100, ¶¶ 2.154-2.157 (describing the importance of aligning accounting
rules in transactional profit splits).
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Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promised Pitfalls of Adopting Unitary Formulary
Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169, 200 (2008).
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IIIB.4. Conclusions re DBRMPA
The DBRMPA combines many of the administrative problems of a residual apportionment
system and an arm’s length system in an attempt to produce a political compromise. That
political compromise allocates part but only part of the residual return to market
jurisdictions. Replacing the current international tax rules with this system would entail
substantial institutional transition costs in the US and elsewhere.129
Adopting a system that combines the issues of a residual apportionment system based on
destination with the issues of an arm’s length system reduces the stakes associated with the
challenges of each part of the new combined system if and only if the relative share of the
excess return allocated to each part of the new combined system is clear. In this regard, a
relative valuation-based DBRMPA recreates the administrative quagmire we had in the US
for valuing acquired intangibles prior to 1993, and expands it to every cross-border
transaction involving an intangible. 130 In contrast, a “formulary DBRMPA” would resolve
this issue by agreeing an arbitrary percentage split of excess returns so as to allocate a set
percentage of the excess to market jurisdictions and the remainder to the current arm’s
length standard. However, the formulary DBRMPA may be subject to the same dynamic
that manifested itself in connection with traditional 3-factor formulary apportionment in
the United States. In other words, jurisdictions are likely to have economic incentives,
revenue incentives, or both to abandon the agreed split and move towards a larger
allocation to the market.
Separately, any DBRMPA method – whether “two-sided,” “one-sided,” or “formulary” –
would face the same issues associated with international tax base harmonization that apply
to unitary taxation systems, as well as the issues associated with determining destination
without a credit-invoice system. Finally, all versions of the DBRMPA would maintain the
problems of the current arm’s length system for transfer pricing on the other intangibles
side of the marketing intangibles vs other intangibles divide.
Part IV. Pairing Inbound and Outbound Minimum Taxes?
This section presents and evaluates a combination of inbound and outbound minimum
taxes as a solution to the current debate over transfer pricing and the allocation of taxing
rights as among jurisdictions. Minimum taxes include traditional CFC-based solutions,
which rely on relative immutability of corporate residence, and newer ideas that combine
outbound and inbound minimum taxes. Such ideas appear to have entered the OECD

Roin’s point was about formulary unitary taxation, but a close look reveals that most of the issues are
related to unitary taxation rather than formulary approaches. Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31
J. Legal Stud. S61, S78-84 (2002) (detailing institutional impediments to development of a common income
tax base).
130
A “one-sided” valuation method DBRMPA could avoid the problems created by a “two-sided” DBRMPA
on the one hand and a “formulary” DBRMPA on the other, but in doing so approaches the result of a DBRPA.
It does so with much more transfer pricing controversy embedded in order to get to that result.
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debate. “Minimum effective taxation” is also an issue that Germany has recently raised at
the most senior levels in European Union policy discussions.
Notably, the GILTI and the BEAT could respectively be described as an attempt to have
outbound and inbound minimum taxes, or as an attempt to ensure minimum effective
taxation. In this Part IV I will suggest that the GILTI and the BEAT can be reimagined to
suggest a workable alternative for the medium-term future of the international tax system.
I expect the US will continue to describe the GILTI and the BEAT with our current
acronyms. However, the reconceived system I describe below is perhaps better described
as a combination of an outbound minimum tax and something like a “reverse CFC” rule.131
The basic concept would be to pair some outbound minimum tax regime (a reformed
GILTI) with defensive measures that would only be applied to multinationals parented in
countries that do not impose a qualifying outbound minimum tax.
IVA. Outbound Minimum Taxes
The GILTI is now highly familiar for the participants at this conference. At the highest
level, the GILTI requires a US shareholder of CFCs to pay a minimum aggregate US and
foreign tax on its share of the earnings of its CFCs on a current basis. Unlike other dividend
exemption systems, the structure of the regime imposes tax on most CFC income, but does
so at a lower rate than domestic income.
As a practical matter the United States is likely to maintain some form of this outbound
minimum tax regime over the medium term. At the present time the Republican party
believes it has renewed American competitiveness with its corporate rate cut and hopes to
protect the basic structure and rates. Meanwhile, Democrats are proposing to raise the
corporate income tax rate and the GILTI rate along with it, but have not suggested altering
the basic architecture of the regime. That political playing field is unsurprising given that
at a 50,000 feet level one can describe the GILTI regime as the Obama Administration
proposal to “Impose a 19 Percent Minimum Tax on Foreign Income,”132 just enacted at
Republican rather than Democratic rates.
Although the basic architecture of an outbound minimum tax is likely to be a stable feature
of US international tax law, the technical details of that construct are subject to change.
The 2017 legislation is legislatively unstable in the sense that various provisions expire by
This idea also has some relationship to proposed special measure number five from the BEPS project’s
2014 public discussion draft on Revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Actions 8, 9 and
10). OECD, Discussion draft on revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Including risk,
recharacterisation and special measures) (2014), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/discussiondraft-actions-8-9-10-chapter-1-TP-Guidelines-risk-recharacterisation-special-measures.pdf.
132
US Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue
Proposals (2016).
131
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their own terms between 2021 and 2025. It is politically vulnerable to revision, because it
was enacted via a party line vote. Finally, it is technically unstable for reasons having to
do both with how some provisions are difficult to administer and others may create
unintended incentives. 133
A few examples of political and technical instability of specific features of the current
GILTI construct are worth mention. At the political level, Democrats are focusing on the
QBAI regime, which exempts a small portion of CFC income from the minimum tax, as
creating (unintended) incentives for offshoring tangible investment and related jobs. 134
Meanwhile, at the technical level, Dana Trier’s paper correctly highlights the complexity
created by the QBAI regime, as well as the problems created by the QBAI regime’s
interaction with the treatment of debt. 135 Separately, many commentators view the
GILTI’s reliance on the existing foreign tax credit and subpart F mechanics to be
administratively inadvisable. There are likely more elegant ways to impose a minimum
tax than building a system based on calculations at the shareholder level using rules written
for entity level calculations. 136 It also is not clear why elements like foreign base company
sales income, foreign base company services income, and section 956 are necessary
components of a minimum tax regime.
I view the combination of a stable basic architecture (an outbound minimum tax regime)
and flexibility as to features and technical/mechanical details of the regime as an
opportunity for meaningful multilateralism. 137 From a US perspective, the pragmatic
reality is that GILTI may be reformed to function more effectively, but the basic minimum
tax concept seems unlikely to be repealed over the medium-term. From a non-US
perspective, the key political fact is that the US was historically the biggest impediment to
a floor to tax competition. Now the US has in effect embraced such a regime, without
133
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S. Comm. On Finance (minority), 115th Cong., Trump’s Tax Law and International Tax: More
Complexity, Loopholes and Incentives to Ship Jobs Offshore (2018). Note also that the articulated purpose
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most of their non-US competitors. This policy rationale is coherent, but it is inapposite in a multilateral
minimum tax regime.
135
Trier’s paper also illustrates that a QBAI regime is not a natural fit with a German-style interest barrier of
the type adopted by the United States in 2017. Trier’s paper correctly treats this problem as a reason to
question why the US has chosen to exempt a return measured as a percentage of QBAI from its minimum
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proposal], which moved forward in the US in the 2017 legislative process as proposed code section 163(n).
In the end, section 163(n) was excised from the US legislation as enacted.
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Treasury and the IRS will almost certainly smooth out many of the rough edges of the 2017 Act in
regulations. But the statutory framework limits their ability to produce a clean system.
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Admittedly, as the thorough New York State Bar Report on the GILTI noted, the current GILTI regime
contains elements of both a flat rate minimum tax on foreign income and an imperfect add-on to the priorlaw subpart F regime. NYSBA Tax Section, Report No. 1394 on the GILTI Provisions of the Code (May 4,
2018), supra note 45. Determining whether Congress intended to enact a flat rate minimum tax or an addon is probably unknowable. What is knowable is that the flat rate theory has a plausible rationale. In contrast,
the GILTI as an imperfect add-on to the prior subpart F regime is normatively difficult to defend.
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necessarily settling on the details in any permanent way. For countries that have wanted a
floor on corporate tax competition and felt the US was an obstacle to such a result, the
unsettled state of GILTI is an opportunity for meaningful and potentially efficacious
dialogue.
Two non-American sovereigns that may find a minimum tax proposal attractive are
Germany and Japan. It is important to understand why: these are export-driven economies.
To the extent source becomes defined as destination, which is the trend we see in the other
proposals discussed in this paper, these countries’ national interest is to find an alternative
to a destination-based income tax system. They and other export-driven economies might
also find minimum tax systems attractive to the extent that they are concerned that the
incidence of a destination-based income tax is more similar to that of a consumption tax
than it is to a residence-based corporate income tax. The most viable alternative to a
destination-based income tax is a multilaterally agreed inbound/outbound minimum tax
regime that supports a version of the residence-based system.
A minimum tax regime that undergirds residence-based taxation is based on concepts that
all currently exist in the law of multiple countries. Therefore, it should be easier to agree
on and implement than a shift to destination-basis taxation. Moreover, such a regime is
more objective than trying to ascribe relative value to different kinds of intangibles.
One important problem with any outbound minimum tax regime is that it applies only to
tax-resident MNCs, and therefore creates incentives to redomicile. Outbound minimum
taxes lower the benefits to a resident MNC eroding the domestic tax base. However, to the
extent the United States, or any other country, imposes such a tax, and no other country
does the same, the country or countries imposing the outbound minimum tax on resident
MNCs discourage corporate tax residence and encourage foreign tax domiciliation for
multinational enterprises. Senator Portman’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
study entitled Impact of the US Tax Code on the Market for Corporate Control and Jobs
persuasively showed that under prior US law “foreign acquirers that hail from more
favorable tax jurisdictions are able to create value simply by restructuring the affairs of the
US target companies to improve their tax profile.” 138 The United States understandably
does not want to be in that world, and other countries would not want to be, either. I
testified to Congress about evidence that an important medium-term result of pressures for
redomiciling MNCs out of the US by tax-driven acquisitions of US firms by foreign firms
would be fewer high-quality jobs for US workers.139 The same would hold true for any
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Majority Staff of Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations, S. Comm. On Homeland Security and
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country that unilaterally adopted an outbound minimum tax without appropriate defensive
measures.
Importantly, multiple countries adopting an outbound minimum tax for resident
multinationals alone also would not in and of itself solve the problems associated with
cross-border M&A to escape that taxpayer-unfavorable residence country tax net. Without
a “defensive measure,” all it takes is one viable corporate headquarters jurisdiction to
defect and choose not to have an outbound minimum tax for the dynamic favoring
acquisitions by tax-favored MNCs to take hold. For that reason, given the fungibility of
tax residence for business units (which can be acquired), new businesses (which can
incorporate initially abroad), and multinationals as a whole (which are routinely acquired
in cross-border M&A transactions) simply differentiating tax burdens based on tax
residence, without measures to discourage avoidance of a basic residence tax burden, is
untenable as a policy option.
Relationship of Outbound Minimum Taxes to German Royalty Barrier
In 2017, Germany enacted the Act against Harmful Tax Practices with regard to Licensing
of Rights (German EStG 4j). This provision of German law restricts the tax deduction of
royalties and similar payments made to related parties if such payments are subject to a
non-OECD-compliant preferential tax regime and are taxed at an effective rate below
25%.140 This rule has a quite targeted scope, but it evolved from a more general German
interest in proposals to encourage or ensure minimum effective taxation. The concept of
encouraging minimum effective taxation at a general level, rather than on an item-by-item
basis, continues to be of interest to German policymakers, including at the finance minister
level.141 Importantly, the German idea of minimum effective taxation as it has developed
in EStG 4j would appear to reflect a country-by-country conception of minimum effective
taxation.142
IVB. Inbound Minimum Taxes
The US Congress was cognizant of the problems associated with taxing resident
multinationals in a harsher way than non-resident multinationals when it enacted the 2017
Act. The “Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code” discussed the importance
the changes in hiring and investment resulting from inversion are not attributable to the onetime effects on
the data due to the inclusion of the foreign acquiring firm’s existing workforce and investments. Rather,
foreign shares of employment and investment are systematically higher two and more years after inversion,
relative to the first year after inversion.
140
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gains (May 2, 2017).
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of “rules to level the playing field between US-headquartered parent companies and
foreign-headquartered parent companies.” 143 In reporting the BEAT to the Senate floor,
the Senate Finance Committee explained that “the current U.S. international tax system
makes foreign ownership of almost any asset or business more attractive than U.S.
ownership… creating a tax-driven incentive for foreign takeovers of U.S. firms… [and]
has created significant financial pressures for U.S. headquartered companies to re-domicile
abroad and shift income to low-tax jurisdictions.” 144 The Senate Finance Committee’s
explanation went on to explain that the BEAT was supposed to be an administrable way to
meet the promise of the framework to level the playing field.
Unfortunately, the BEAT as enacted does not appear to have met this goal. However, the
concept of using an inbound tax to defend residence-based taxation is quite rational.
Importantly, the defense of an outbound minimum tax would work best if undertaken via
multilateral coordination.
The BEAT that Could Be: A Reverse CFC Rule
Four high-level changes would be required to convert the BEAT into a useful inbound base
erosion prevention mechanism that also encourages foreign sovereigns to adopt outbound
minimum taxes. First, the BEAT would need to be amended so as not to apply to
multinationals tax resident in a jurisdiction that imposed a qualifying minimum tax regime.
The definition of a qualifying outbound minimum tax would presumably follow the
contours of a multilateral agreement. Second, the reformed BEAT would need to be
limited to actual base-eroding payments. Most importantly this would mean repealing the
disallowance of foreign-tax credits and NOLs in present law BEAT. Third, the base
erosion percentage limitation would need to be excised. Finally, the BEAT would need to
be expanded to cover at least the value of intangible property embedded in goods, or
perhaps to cover goods in their entirety. As explained below, the last of these is viable if
the purpose of the reformed BEAT were to incentivize other jurisdictions to adopt
qualifying outbound minimum taxes, rather than to raise revenue.
The inbound regime (“BEAT 2.0”) described above could be accurately described as a
“defensive measure.” The base amount would still be determined by taking the taxpayer’s
taxable income increased by certain base-erosion items. As in the current regime,
taxpayers would multiply the BEAT base amount by a given percent of the BEAT base. If
that amount exceeded their otherwise-applicable US tax liability, they would pay the
difference between the BEAT amount and their regular tax liability.
However, unlike the current BEAT, this regime would apply only to multinational groups
that were not subject at the parent level to an (internationally-recognized) qualifying
outbound minimum tax. As a result, countries whose multinationals operate extensively
US Dep’t of the Treasury, Unified Framework for Fixing Our Broken Tax Code 9 (2017).
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in the US market would have an incentive to adopt qualifying outbound minimum taxes.
The incentives in this regard would be much stronger if the United States and the European
Union and/or Japan were to take such steps in a coordinated fashion. In a multilaterally
agreed minimum tax regime with coordinated defensive measures, multinational
corporations would have strong incentives to remain headquartered in key jurisdictions that
had qualifying outbound minimum taxes and were thus part of the new international
consensus.
Various criticisms of this approach are available. Let me address just three. First, this
approach would require some degree of agreement with respect to the acceptable outer
boundaries of outbound minimum tax regimes. Minimum standards with respect to an
outbound minimum tax regime represent a certain degree of tax harmonization. Some
might fear this would represent a slippery slope towards even further tax harmonization,
and that such constraints on tax competition are inappropriate. However, I would suggest
to such critics that tax sovereignty is a basic interest of national sovereigns, and that a small
step in the direction of coordinated rules may not in this case be a particularly slippery
slope.
Moreover, note that the minimum tax regime likely requires much less tax harmonization
than the DBRMPA. Inbound minimum taxes used as defensive measures to backstop the
outbound minimum tax regime require determining some effective tax rate for the
outbound regimes of jurisdictions that formally impose an outbound minimum tax.
Otherwise countries could adopt an outbound minimum tax at the appropriate rate on a
very narrowly defined base.
But note that the harmonized base definition issues are actually less extensive than in the
DBRMPA. Unlike in a DBRMPA (or user participation), in the minimum tax structure the
national rules that determine the base from which the effective tax rate is measured only
matters with respect to the question of whether a national defensive measure is imposed.
As a result, the pressures for countries to agree on a shared definition of the appropriate
tax base are low. In the minimum effective taxation regime, the base only matters for the
purpose of measuring the effective tax rate imposed in another jurisdiction, rather than for
purposes of actually splitting up the tax base. As a result, inconsistent national definitions
are fine within some wide margins. In contrast, in the DBRMPA and under user
participation, the absence of base harmonization can have consequences in every case,
because both of those approaches are unitary tax systems. Consistent definitions are
needed to split up a base and therefore avoid double taxation. As a result, the pressures to
harmonize are higher.
Second, Part IIIB.1. highlights why it is difficult to write regulations that separate
embedded intangibles from the overall value of a tangible good in an administrable way.
Sales of products containing embedded intangibles present a challenge for any inbound
base protection rule that is meant to be WTO-compliant while raising revenue; rather than
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acting as an incentive for other countries to adopt a regime that is exempt from the inbound
base protection rule/defensive measure.145
In contrast, if the inbound base erosion/defensive measure rule applies only to
multinationals that are not subject to a qualifying outbound minimum tax regime, and if
(for example) the United States, the European Union, and perhaps Japan have all adopted
such regimes, then “rough justice” that erred on the side of inclusion in destination country
tax bases would not be a problem.146 Indeed, onerous rough justice would help ensure
widespread adoption of qualifying outbound minimum taxes. As more jurisdictions
adopted qualifying outbound minimum taxes, the treatment of COGS in cross-border
transactions with corporations’ whose parent entity was tax resident in a jurisdiction
without a minimum tax would become ever less important. 147
Third, some might suggest that the minimum tax solution would not stop some sovereigns
from separately enacting unilateral measures to ring-fence and tax large US tech firms
participating in the digital economy. I have sympathy for this critique. We are living
through a mercantilist and politically charged moment in international economic law (and
the US is not exempt from this characterization). In the current environment, some
sovereigns do seem to want a shift of the “digital” tax base, rather than to ensure a single
level of tax on corporate income. The minimum tax proposal does not affect a shift of the
tax base from residence to destination, and does not serve a mercantilist end in the digital
sector. Thus, some sovereigns might take unilateral measures to accomplish their desired
ends with respect to the digital sector on top of a minimum tax. Indeed, this concern may
motivate the marketing intangibles proposal.
However, given that the United States already has a GILTI and is unlikely to repeal it in
the medium term, I do not believe the “but it won’t stop other countries’ digital proposals”
critique substantially changes the US policy calculus. Rather, if other sovereigns see
redeeming features in the basic outlines of the American status quo, that outcome is in the
national interest of the United States. This conclusion does not change if it turns out that
multilateral agreement on a minimum effective taxation regime does not also completely
stop unilateral efforts by some sovereigns to target the US tech sector. No proposal
145

In an inbound base erosion regime intended to raise revenue, disaggregation of embedded intangibles
could be required for cross-border payments associated with the supply in the United States of any good or
service. Huge pressure would then exist for regulations attempting such a disaggregation to avoid
overbreadth.
146
It may be that such an agreement could not be reached with the EU in advance of March 29, 2019, the
date for which Brexit is scheduled. Note also that from a US perspective what would be important would be
for an agreed defensive measure to be applied by all EU member states at the external EU border. If freedom
of establishment constraints prevented application of a defensive measure by EU sovereigns in regard of
payments to other EU member states, that limitation would not raise any fundamental US policy concern.
147
Importantly, so long as the inbound minimum tax is intended as a defensive measure rather than a
meaningful revenue raiser, principled answers with respect to the currently intractable problems raised by
embedded intangibles and foreign corporations with no taxable nexus under current standards are simply not
necessary. Given the technical challenges raised by these two issues, the ability to avoid them is a significant
advantage.
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(including the marketing intangibles proposal) can fully stop such efforts in any case; the
political reality abroad that views the US tech sector with distrust is simply too strong.
What is important is that an agreement to implement a minimum tax block a multilateral
agreement on a digital-only proposal, and also that the foreign countries most interested in
a minimum tax outcome commit (including on a bilateral basis) not to pursue digital-only
measures.148 In other words, although the tech sector is an important US national interest,
it is clearly not the only US national interest in the field of international taxation. Rather,
our broadest interest should be to stabilize the international tax system generally, ensure
that its architecture remains principled, provide certainty for all of our businesses, and bring
our new international tax system more closely into alignment with international norms.
Although a multilateral agreement on a minimum effective taxation regime would not
necessarily stop every foreign sovereign from enacting tech-specific tax proposals, it would
likely discourage many sovereigns from doing so. To provide a simple example, if the
German government were to agree to a minimum tax proposal as a solution to the digital
tax question, and commit not to enact a digital-only proposal, it seems unlikely they would
renege over the medium term. In my judgment the diplomatic and technocratic political
culture of Germany is not such that it would agree to a solution to the digital issue that
involved a minimum tax multilaterally, and then shortly thereafter enact a digitally-focused
tax. A similar observation might be made about many governments (consider Japan for
example). If the European Commission were to sign on to a minimum effective taxation
agreement to settle the digital tax debate, it is also unlikely that the letter of the agreement
would be abandoned. In that particular case, from a US perspective having both EU
member states and the Commission commit to an agreement is important. The US should
insist at the OECD that the Commission be an independent party to any agreement.
To address any concerns about individual countries behaving perfidiously, the United
States should consider including a punitive measure in its reformed inbound minimum tax
(BEAT 2.0) to discourage the imposition of particularly destructive taxes. For example, in
my view today’s gross basis turnover taxes on digital business represent a relatively
transparent mercantilist effort to target US firms. US law could be structured so as to apply
the reformed BEAT to jurisdictions that imposed taxes targeted at US MNCs, even if they
adopted a minimum tax regime. As a statutory matter one could use section 891 as a model
in this respect. Such a tool would be perceived to have legitimacy internationally if it were
tied to a multilateral agreement on minimum taxation. International legitimacy (even if
not complete acceptance) should be an important consideration for those of us concerned
with reestablishing stability in the broader international economic law environment. 149
Finally, one might be concerned that the United States itself might want to abandon the
minimum tax at a future date. The US could unilaterally overcome its fiscal challenges
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In the case of Germany, an important question also arises as to whether there should be a commitment to
block EU-level digital-only solutions.
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More generally, the points above about coordination as to minimum standards for an outbound minimum
tax regime would not require agreement as to all the details of the inbound minimum taxes (defensive
measures) enacted by individual countries that are intended to backstop the outbound minimum tax regime.
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and obtain fiscal leeway to lessen its reliance on our economically inefficient corporate
double tax by adopting a new revenue source, such as a VAT. At that juncture a
multilateral minimum tax regime would function as an unwelcome constraint. However,
a new revenue source is not in the offing at this time in the United States. Moreover, it
seems unlikely that the political process will soon sanction reducing corporate tax rates by
increasing individual income taxes. As a result, anti-base erosion measures will probably
continue to be needed over the medium term.
Conclusion
The international tax system that emerged after World War II had the important advantage
of being nestled within a broader world order that, in Henry Kissinger’s classic
formulation, “had the advantage of uniform perceptions.” 150 Countries accepted that the
United States led the post-war international economic order of the free world. Almost as
a minor corollary, countries generally accepted that the United States led the development
of the transfer pricing regime, too.
In contrast, few observers would claim that today’s international economic climate features
uniform perceptions. The current state of international tax affairs reflects the broader
disarray.
One important goal in this difficult environment should be to reestablish some stability to
the international tax regime. Among other things, doing so could contribute to the broader
goal of stabilizing our system of international economic law more generally.
If medium-term international tax stability is a goal, any answer to the questions raised by
the digital economy cannot be limited to any definition of the digital economy, because no
corporate international tax problem is unique to the digital economy. Moreover, the
features of the digital economy that proponents of a digital-only solution might point to are
gradually expanding to encompass the bulk of the economy.
However, the digitization of the economy does force policymakers to confront a basic
choice between destination-based corporate income taxation and residence-based corporate
income taxation. A shift from our residence-based system to a destination-based corporate
income tax, if agreed to by the major economies, is certainly a viable option. But moving
to a DBRPA would require significantly higher levels of information exchange and
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Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 27 (1994). Not only was the United States the only country with the
economic might to organize the international tax system of the capitalist world – its capacity to dictate
international tax rules was part of a broader reality in which, in the Cold War period, the US in effect
organized most aspects of the economic and military structure of the noncommunist developed world. US
tax leadership, like US political and economic leadership more broadly, was accepted in large part because
of a threat the developed noncommunist world perceived; namely that without US leadership the world might
fall under Soviet domination.
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collection assistance than currently exist. More fundamentally, a shift all the way to a
destination-based corporate income tax presently seems politically implausible.
Indeed, the current debate internationally does not include a full move to destination-based
corporate income taxation as an alternative. Instead there are two proposals that in effect
split the baby between destination-based corporate income taxation and residence-based
corporate income taxation. These are the user participation theory and the DBRMPA.
The latter “compromise” proposal, the DBRMPA, is principled and, at the 100,000 foot
level, may appear politically attractive. It does change the balance of allocation of taxing
rights. However, the DBRMPA creates a new set of administrative challenges for which
we may not have solutions, while leaving the problems of the current transfer pricing
system in place, and adding a new source of fundamental controversy – the appropriate
split of excess returns between the market and the current transfer pricing system. These
issues could play out as between governments and between governments and MNCs with
respect to every cross-border transaction. What analyzing the DBRMPA highlights is that
compromise between a destination-based income tax and a residence-based corporate
income tax, even principled compromise, is hard to administer. Splitting the baby is
probably unwise. If policymakers wish for a destination-based income tax, they should
really try to go all the way there.
That said, if policymakers consider the compromise that is the DBRMPA, they should
abandon the notion of measuring the relative value of marketing and non-marketing
intangibles and accept a simple formulary split between the two residual return categories.
It seems to me that in a DBRMPA system, a formulary approach, ideally backstopped by
mandatory binding arbitration, is the only way to control the extent of tax controversy.
Note, however, that there is currently no international law mechanism that would easily
ensure that countries would respect an agreement to a specific allocation of the excess
return between marketing intangibles and other intangibles. Bilateral tax treaties are not
well-suited to enshrining such an approach; a multilateral treaty (not the MLI of the BEPS
project) might be needed.
In contrast to destination-basis corporate income taxation, a minimum tax regime that
undergirds residence-based taxation is based on concepts that all currently exist in the law
of multiple countries. Therefore, it should be easier to agree on and implement than the
DBRMPA, because it does not require tackling all the issues involved in a shift to
destination-basis corporate income taxation. A minimum tax regime also (perhaps
counterintuitively) requires less extensive international coordination than a DBRMPA.
Finally, in a multilaterally agreed regime that included both outbound and inbound
minimum taxes, multinational corporations would have strong incentives to remain
headquartered in key jurisdictions that had qualifying outbound minimum taxes. Thus, the
weakest point of a residence-based system – redomiciliation and tax-driven cross-border
M&A – would be addressed. Compared to a partial move to destination-basis corporate
income taxation, undergirding the residence-based regime with outbound and inbound
minimum taxes seems both less disruptive and more administrable.
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What is the mechanism for getting there? Success will require discussions around both
substance and process to take place at the OECD. Americans must be aware that it will
not be the sort of discussion the United States tended to have at the OECD a generation or
two ago. The United States no longer is the uncontested leader of the capitalist world, and
it does not have an uncontested leadership position in international tax, either. Rather, the
best hope in the 21 st century is to use the OECD in international tax the way Metternich
used the Congress of Vienna in European military affairs in the 19th century – as a
mechanism to overcome quite significant differences in perspective via a balance of power,
and in the process (re)build legitimacy, shared values, and a stable equilibrium.
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